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# **A HERITAGE OF FREEDOM**

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**OR THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF  
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES**





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# HERITAGE *of* FREEDOM

OR

THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF THE  
ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

BY

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ETC.



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TO THE DISTINGUISHED POLITICAL HEIR OF  
SIR EDWIN SANDYS AND THOMAS JEFFERSON

THE VISCOUNT BRYCE

IN ADDITION TO THE OBLIGATION OWED BY  
ALL FOR HIS GREAT PUBLIC SERVICES, THE  
AUTHOR GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGES HIS PER-  
SONAL INDEBTEDNESS FOR MANY KINDNESSES



## PREFACE

FOR invaluable criticism, helpful suggestions, and generous encouragement in the preparation of these pages, the author is indebted not only to a number of noted historians and scholars engaged in the two-fold work of research and interpretation, but also to men of liberal sympathies, broad interests, and extended contact with the affairs and peoples of many lands.

—*M. P. A.*



## INTRODUCTION

**F**OR more than a hundred years, the people of two great English-speaking nations in North America have faced each other on a border line of several thousand miles without the expenditure of a dollar on the construction of fortifications on land or warships on the Lakes as a protection or a menace to either country.

In Europe, on the other hand, along a border line only one-thirtieth as long, two nations have spent, in fifty years, more than fifty times the amount of money that the United States invested in securing the 895,000 square miles of territory known as the Louisiana Purchase.

This contrast illustrates the difference between a continuous peace and a constant menace or open conflict. Such a state of peace as that which has existed in America was not created by fiat; nor has it been the conception of mere dreamers. It is due to the fact that, in Canada and in the United States, the ideals of the two English-speaking peoples have been the same, and the governments have been responsive to the will of two free and intelligent peoples who have come to think of each other only in terms of friendship.

Despite these long-maintained amicable relations

with an important part of the British Commonwealth, the older American histories have, by their treatment of the Revolutionary conflict and the War of 1812, helped to create an active anti-British sentiment. They have elaborated upon the comparatively brief clashes with the British Government in a manner that is out of all proportion to the attention given to a period ten times as long of reciprocal good offices and of peaceful intercourse between the two nations. Against the former teachings that, in 1776, the Americans were a united people struggling against unmitigated oppression and tyranny, the historian of to-day shows how the separation of the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples was the result of an armed conflict between the then autocratic and unpopular government of Great Britain under George III on the one side and an active patriot party representing about a third of the people of the British colonies in America on the other.

This new history would also make it clear that the patriot party in America succeeded in establishing an independent government, not solely by force of arms but also by reason of the fact that the aggressive acts of the personal government of George III were opposed by the same sort of people in England that had set up the standards of liberty in America. The sympathies of the English *people* were not with the war waged by a minority ministry in Britain, but rather with the principles and ideals of their fellow countrymen of the patriot party in America.

The blundering government of George III fell,



therefore, before the armed opposition in America and the political opposition at home. The American Revolution had, in like manner, a double result—it secured the self-government of the revolted colonies in America, on the one hand, and the final overthrow of royal rule in the mother country, on the other. In America, George Washington soon became known as the “Father of his Country”; but he was later acclaimed in the British Parliament as the “Founder of the British Commonwealth,” which now comprises the British Isles, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The present union between these five colonial offshoots and the mother country represents, in actual practice, Thomas Jefferson’s expressed theory of what such a union should be; for, in the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson wrote: “We have reminded them [the British] of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here . . . that these were effected at the expense of our own blood and treasure, unassisted by the wealth or the strength of Great Britain [the Crown and Government]. That in constituting indeed our several forms of government, we had adopted one common king, *thereby laying a foundation for perpetual league and amity with them; but that submission to their Parliament was no part of our constitution.*” Had these facts been recognised by the British Government, Jefferson continued: “*We might have been a free and a great people together.*” \*

\* See quotation from statement of Edward Rider, made in 1623, page 20.

It is well known that political misunderstandings lead to war; but it is not generally realised that historical misconceptions are equally dangerous to the peace of nations. Especially is this true if these misconceptions keep alive an unreasonable distrust of a friendly nation. The maintenance of such distrust is illustrated by a review of our generally accepted treatment of Anglo-American relations; yet it is easily demonstrable that, for a period of one hundred years, the increasingly liberal British government has been the most powerful external support of Pan-American democracy. Since the War of 1812, many serious difficulties which have arisen between Great Britain and the United States have been settled by arbitration, in sharp contrast with the methods in vogue between other great Powers. When these disputes were decided to the disadvantage of Great Britain, the decisions were accepted with good grace. In other instances, Britain has, without arbitration, yielded to America the points at issue. As far as the actual results are concerned, it is quite beside the point whether the motives of the British government have been altruistic or wholly selfish; but it seems clear that the far-flung British Commonwealth has been the natural ally of America in the cause of freedom and peace.

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# **A HERITAGE OF FREEDOM**



# A HERITAGE OF FREEDOM

## FOUNDING OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

**A**FTER James, King of Scotland, had been proclaimed King of England in 1603, he entered London by way of Aldersgate. A few years later, this despotically inclined ruler declared his intention to memorialise Aldersgate as the point where his Royal Highness entered the English capital. Autocratic rulers had preceded James on the English throne, but none of them had held the office of king in such high repute and the rights of the people in such disdain. In short, James I insisted that since he was a ruler by divine authority, he could not be held accountable to or by the people.

He caused, therefore, to be put in high relief upon the memorial arch the sculptured figure of himself in royal robes. Desiring, also, to lay emphasis upon the theory of the "divine right of kings," he selected appropriate passages from the Old Testament for inscription on the historic arch under which he had passed. On the east side he caused to be written: "Then shall enter into the gates of this city

Kings and Princes.” On the west side he inscribed: “And Samuel said unto all Israel, Behold, I have hearkened unto your voice in all that you have said unto me, and have made a KING over you.”\*

It was a strange twist of fate that within a stone’s cast of the Aldersgate arch there should have then been standing the house of Sir Edwin Sandys, who was destined to establish, in defiance of the British King and Spanish intrigue, the principles of representative democracy in the New World. While the royal arch was under construction, there gathered in this house, from time to time, a number of the choicest spirits of the Elizabethan Age. As James I sought to strengthen the bonds of autocracy, Sir Edwin Sandys and his group of English patriots met together to devise a way of breaking those bonds and thereby setting the people free. Sandys and his associates were the forerunners of the English and American patriots and statesmen, such as Hampden, Pym, Cromwell, Pitt, Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and Madison.

Since it seemed that democracy could not then be established in the Old World, Sir Edwin and his associates determined to attempt it in the New. As this great apostle of liberty looked out of his win-

\* Cf. “Here my grandfather again, by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon his head, once more distinctly emphasising the fact that it was accorded him by the will of God alone . . . and that he looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of heaven. . . . *Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, without regard to the opinions and intentions of the day, I go my way.*”

—From speech of William II at Koenigsberg, August 25, 1910.



dows upon the Gate through which the self-willed autocrat had entered, his imagination must have pictured a free people going forth from it who should carry with them principles of political progress, popular enlightenment, and religious liberty. Braving, therefore, the dungeon cell and the executioner's axe, he deliberately planned what now seems to have been the "GREATEST POLITICAL EXPERIMENT OF THE AGES."

The name and fame of Sandys have been obscured through the ruthless attacks of a vindictive autocrat and his licensed historians; for James I began to realise, just too late, that Sandys had prepared a very definite plan for the subversion of autocratic rule. No wonder, then, that James afterwards referred to Sir Edwin as "our greatest enemy," and a "crafty man with ambitious designs." In spite, however, of almost insuperable obstacles and opposition, Sandys lived to see the success of his Great Experiment in the establishment of that Anglo-American democracy which was to overthrow the personal rule of the last of the British autocrats and profoundly affect the destinies of nations.

The remodeling of Aldersgate, dedicated to the divine origin of autocracy, was soon completed. In 1607, however, a colony of Englishmen was permanently settled at Jamestown; and, in 1609, and again in 1612, the most important events in the beginnings of America took place, when charters for the self-government of the colony were secured from the King by Sandys and his associates. These charters blazed

the trail over which were to pass the political liberties of thirteen self-governing colonies.

Contrary to Spanish, Portuguese, and French precedents in colonisation, the British Crown was not called upon to support the first Anglo-American settlement with money or other means of subsistence. Had the Crown borne this expense, James I would have had better grounds for absolute control of the settlement; but the providing of men, money, and equipment was undertaken by a group of Englishmen incorporated into what was known as the London or Virginia Company. This group was not immediately able to secure for the colonists anything better than the King's form of government; but the settlers themselves, under the leadership of Captains Ratcliffe, Archer, Martin, and others, bestirred themselves to introduce popular reform in that government from the beginning; and it was Captain Archer who, a few months after the first landing, *proposed the calling of a colonial parliament* with a view to overturning the "Sovereign rule" set up by Captain John Smith as the appointee of King James. In 1609, Ratcliffe and Archer, taking with them "a breath of the free air of Virginia," visited England and aided the liberal spirits of the mother country to secure the Great Charter which definitely established the beginnings of popular government in America.\*

\* Edward Rider, a member of the patriot party and of the Virginia Company, wrote, as early as 1623:

*"There is a material difference between the Spanish and English plantations. For the Spanish colonies were founded by*

Under James I a menacing absolutism was casting its shadow upon Church and State. Liberty-loving Englishmen began to fear the overthrow of such popular rights as had been wrung from their former rulers. It was then that their thoughts turned to the New World, and they "laid hold on this expectation of Virginia as a providence cast before them of two-fold advantage,"—of escaping the intolerable tyranny of autocratic rule and of creating a "more free" government in America. Besides religious controversies, which were aggravated by James I, and the constant political controversies between King and Parliament, which were to culminate in the temporary overthrow of the monarchy thirty years later, there were controversies with Spain. The Spanish had, from the first, protested against English settlement in the New World; they had already seized one vessel on the way to Jamestown; and it is interesting to note that the chairman of the "Committee on Spanish wrongs" in Parliament was Sir Edwin Sandys.

At this time, also, there was gradually developing a more or less secret "Court Party," working in sympathy with the autocratic ideas of the King of Spain, to which was opposed what may be called the "Patriot Party," working for the advancement of liberal principles of government. James I and Philip III

*the kings of Spain out of their own treasury and revenues, and they maintain the garrisons there, together with a large Navy for their use and defence; whereas, the English plantations had been first settled and since supported at the charge of private adventurers and planters."*

were equally interested in suppressing the freedom of their peoples. Liberty had made some progress in England, but almost none in Spain; yet it is a curious coincidence that Philip, the autocrat of Spain, was, in effect, obliged to recognise the independence of the Netherlands in the same year that the autocratic James was forced to grant the Great Charter to Anglo-American democracy in order to preserve English settlement in the New World. The year 1609, therefore, witnessed: (1) the grant of the First Charter of self-government in America; (2) the liberation of the Netherlands from Spanish tyranny; and, (3) the assured opening in that country of an asylum for the "Pilgrims," who were, in 1620, to found the second free English settlement in North America.

The Charter of 1609 was drafted by Sir Edwin Sandys and prepared for the signature of the King by Sir Francis Bacon and Sir Henry Hobart. The instrument provided for the Jamestown colonists prerogatives and privileges of government which had not been secured by Englishmen in the mother country. However discreetly, in the immediate presence of the autocratic King, they may have disguised their purposes in their official papers and petitions, the Patriot Party proposed nothing less than "*to erect a free popular State,*"—a republic whose inhabitants were to have "*no government putt upon them but by their own consente.*"\*

\* Cf. "Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."—Declaration of



The "new history" that has recently become the subject of much discussion represents a new interpretation of an old subject. This new interpretation would subordinate the extravaganzas of kings and princes, with their court favourites and personal adventures. In short, it endeavours to tell more of the history of the people, of social reforms, and of the development of political principles. Such an interpretation should henceforth be applied to the beginnings of America. By far the greater part of our accustomed narrative of the first Anglo-American settlement has concerned itself with the figure of King James I; the personal adventures of Captain John Smith, as told by him; and the story of Pocahontas. We have, consequently, been following a shadow and have missed the substance. The romance of a great reform movement in the midst of a remarkable period of transition in British politics should be unfolded as we learn to appreciate the heroic figures of men who risked their lives and fortunes in the planting and the cultivation of representative democracy in the distant "wilderness" of North America. Sir Edwin Sandys led the forces of English democracy to a triumph of far greater import than the more spectacular achievement of William the Silent in the liberation of the Netherlands. For three hundred years it has been a travesty on the truth of history for Americans to bear laurels to

Independence. Thomas Jefferson wrote also, even though he did not then have at hand the hidden records of the Patriot Party: "*The ball of the Revolution received its first impulse, not from the actors in that event, but from the first colonists.*"

the shrine of John Smith, who traduced or belittled the Patriot Party of England and America, rather than to the grave of Edwin Sandys, the leading spirit among the Founders of liberty in America.

Among the associates of this inspired Englishman were numbered nearly all the great independent spirits of the Elizabethan Age. For example, there may be mentioned as friends of Sandys, or in sympathy with his ideals: Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Philip Sidney, William Shakespeare, the Earls of Lincoln, Pembroke, and Exeter, Lord De la Warr, Sir Oliver Cromwell, Sir Dudley Digges, and Henry and Thomas Wriothesly, Earls of Southampton, who, with John and Nicholas Ferrar, secretly preserved many of the records which James I sought to suppress, and in which we now are beginning to find the faithful history of the truly revolutionary purposes of the Founders of America.\*

After the First Charter of American democracy had been secured, the liberal spirits in the management of the colony sought to make America a refuge for the oppressed. Puritans and "Pilgrims" were offered the freedom in Virginia which they had begun to seek in the Netherlands. Many accepted, and more would have availed themselves of the offer had not the royally appointed officials of the English Church interfered in the movement. The lamp of liberty had been lighted in the New World to be

\* Henry Wriothesly, Earl of Southampton, was also the noble patron of Shakespeare to whom the latter dedicated much of his work. Southampton was, perhaps, second only to Sandys in founding democracy in America.

kept burning as long as human freedom is destined to exist.

The fleet that bore the Sandys Charter set sail for America on June 12, 1609. On the way, it encountered the storm which has been immortalised by Shakespeare in *The Tempest*. The charter ship, which was well-named *The Sea Adventure*, was wrecked off the coast of "the still vex'd Bermoothes"; but the document and its bearers were saved while the other vessels of the fleet rode the storm in safety and reached their destination. Governor Gates, Admiral Somers, and their men supported themselves on wild game and fruits until they had constructed two small ships, which they named the *Deliverance* and the *Patience*, in which they set sail for Virginia.\*

\*The *Deliverance* and the *Patience* were the first vessels built in the New World by English settlers. In *The Tempest*, Shakespeare, the friend of Sandys and the Earl of Southampton, depicts Ariel as a soul seeking liberty. Prince Ferdinand may be likened to the spirit of British democracy that finds its mate in Miranda, the virgin bride, America.

## BEGINNINGS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

When, on June 2, 1610, Gates arrived at Jamestown and assumed the government of the colony under the First Charter of our liberties, he did so on the anniversary of the royal grant of that Charter. Captain George Percy, of the original colonists of 1607, gave place to Gates and the new popular government was formally inaugurated in a solemn ceremonial. James I had selected the scriptural quotation for the royal arch at Aldersgate; but the Reverend Richard Buck, the minister of the colony in the New World, preached for the people from the truly prophetic text: "Now the Lord had said unto Abram, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will shew thee. And I will make of thee a great nation . . . and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed."\*

There were present on this epochal occasion about sixty of the earlier emigrants, including such sturdy English seamen and settlers as Captains George Percy, Daniel Tucker, Nathaniel Powell, and John Martin, the last of whom long outlived his compatriots as the most prosperous colonist of the first

\* The following lines are the first and tenth stanzas of a poem on the first voyage written by Michael Drayton, England's patriot-poet of the day and occasion. Drayton was born near



emigrants. Among the new arrivals were Captain George Yeardley and his "Company of old Soldiers trained up in the Netherlands,"—a connecting link between the newly established freedom of the Dutch people and the beginnings of self-government on the part of the English in America. John Rolfe and Pocahontas were there, and it is of special interest to know that among those who must have watched proceedings with an interest fraught with moment to the expansion of Anglo-American liberty, was Stephen Hopkins, afterwards one of the Pilgrim emigrants and the father of Oceanus Hopkins, born on board the *Mayflower* in 1620.

The accidental discovery of the Bermudas "through tempest and shipwreck" led the Virginia Company to seize the occasion to apply for a new charter for the Jamestown colony, ostensibly to provide for the inclusion of the "new islands," but chiefly to extend the principles of self-government. This charter also was drafted by that great Founder

the birthplace of Shakespeare, and his tomb is near those of Chaucer and Spenser.

You brave heroique minds,  
Worthy your countries name,  
That honour still pursue,  
Goe, and subdue,  
Whilst loyt'ring hinds  
Lurk here at home with shame. . . .

And in regions farre,  
Such heroes bring yee foorth  
As those from whom we came;  
And plant our name  
Under that starre  
Not knowne unto our north.

of American democracy, Sir Edwin Sandys, and it too was drawn up by Sir Francis Bacon and Sir Henry Hobart. The preliminary petition to this charter was presented shortly after the return of Governor Gates to England in September, 1610; but the opposition of the Court, or Autocratic, Party, assisted by the machinations of the Spanish ambassadors, had begun to develop. Disguise it as they might, the entire plan of the patriot leaders was becoming more and more evident. Consequently, the second charter of Anglo-American democracy was not wrung from the reluctant James until March, 1612.\*

The charter of 1612 not only extended the privileges of the colonists in America, but it cleared the way for the establishment in larger communities of *representative democracy*, the practice of which has

\*In the same year appeared Captain John Smith's "*True Relation*" of Virginia and one year later a publication on the colony by the Reverend Samuel Purchas. These accounts of the Jamestown colonists were very unfavourable to the Patriot Party in both countries. They were approved, however, by the king; and thereafter royal opposition to the Virginia Company became increasingly bitter until that corporation was dissolved by royal mandate in 1624. No printed refutation of these volumes could be offered; for such a publication would not pass the royal censorship. Not only was the Patriot Party compelled to labour under this disadvantage, but its records were afterwards seized and destroyed, *as far as possible*, by the officers of the Crown.

No one with intelligence and the "rare gift of common sense" can place much confidence in the unsupported narrative of Captain John Smith, in view of the fact that so large a proportion of his narrative is patently false. Dr. J. Franklin Jameson has correctly summarised the evidence as follows: "*Smith's narrative is a remarkable historical mosaic, of which it may almost be said that what is historical is not his, and what is his is not historical.*"—*History of Historical Writing in America*.

since been exercised in safety and with success by liberty-loving and highly developed peoples. Consequently, in August, 1619, the first representative assembly of free men met at Jamestown on American soil and took a forward step in self-government which was to prepare the way for the English colonies that were to follow and for the nation that was yet to be.

In England, however, the forces working in behalf of freedom were not strong enough to withstand the now thoroughly aroused jealousy of an autocratic king and his court. Furthermore, the fears of James I were aggravated by the emissaries of Spanish autocracy. Under the direction of Count Gondomar, ambassador from Spain, spies were set to watch the proceedings of the Virginia Company. These reported to the English King, through the wily Gondomar, that "*the Virginia Court in London would prove a seminary for a seditious Parliament,*" and James had already had much trouble with parliament. The king, therefore, became fully persuaded that the matter of government for America, as well as Britain, "*was too high and great for private men to manage.*" For that reason he considered that it was time to take the business into his own hands and "govern it" both in England and America "according to his will and pleasure."\*

\* "*Ourself,*" the king announced in a letter to parliament, "*will make it our work to settle the quiet and welfare of the plantations.*" At about this time, James I felt compelled to write *A Premonition to All Most Mighty Monarchs*. In 1616, he wrote *A Remonstrance of the Most Gracious King James I for the Right of Kings and the Independence of their Crownes*. He later ordered the suppression of *A Game at Chess*, Thomas

In accordance with this determination, James I set about devising plausible excuses for accomplishing the dissolution of the Virginia or London Company. First, he issued instructions for the preparation of further discreditable publications concerning the management and conduct of the colony.\* He then appointed a Commission to make inquiry into the "true estate" of Virginia and gave that body to understand the nature of the verdict he would be pleased to receive. Accordingly, after visiting Jamestown, the Commission returned a very unfavourable report as to the management of the Virginia Company and Colony, which furnished the King with what he considered sufficient cause "*to reduce that popular form [of government] so as to make it agree with the monarchial form which was held in the rest of his Royall Monarchie.*"

Middleton's allegorical satire on the Spanish Court Party, which was acted at the Globe Theatre in 1623 amid much popular applause.

Just as the proclamations of James I with regard to the divine right of kings closely resemble the imperial promulgations of William II of Germany (Cf. p. 18 footnote), the secret work of Gondomar in England resembles that of Count Luxburg in Argentina, three hundred years later. Gondomar, however, while working secretly to injure the English people at the very time he was openly professing cordial friendship for them, does not seem to have suggested the sinking of English ships "without a trace." "*Spurlos versenkt*" was reserved for expression by a later representative of autocracy.

\* Cf. Nathaniel Butler's "*The Unmasking of Virginia.*" This pamphlet, full of unmerited abuse for the Patriot Party in England and the Colonists in America, was an additional contribution to the "twisting of the evidence" in the writings of Captain John Smith and Samuel Purchas, published in 1612 and 1613.



Under pretence of "princelye" liberality towards his dutiful but erring subjects, James offered the Virginia Company an autocratic "compromise." This "compromise" gave the appearance of popular control of the "Virginia businesse" through the appointment of Commissioners in England and America to direct the affairs of the Colony. It also made provision to guarantee *the investments of the contributors to the stock of the Company*. In this latter offer lay the supreme test of the patriotism of the Founders of Anglo-American democracy. It would have been comparatively easy to argue, to the satisfaction of less noble spirits, that the acceptance of this "compromise" was better than the otherwise certain dissolution of the Company; for it seems always harder to live and give one's all to one's country than to die for it. But these English patriots did not hesitate in their choice. It was a matter of principle with them, and they chose to sacrifice their fortunes in order to establish free government in America, just as their political successors, the patriot leaders of the American Revolution, were ready, one hundred and fifty years later, to risk their all for the preservation of self-government.

The members of the Virginia Company must have fully understood that the rejection of the King's "compromise" would mean the loss of their investments, while its acceptance would secure them. Nevertheless, the vote on the royal "compromise" showed "but nine hands" in favour of it, while the remainder of the seventy members then voting op-

posed it; so that, by the same token, they stood together in unshaken devotion to the maintenance of liberal institutions in America and the rights of English citizens at home. The vote of the Company was taken on the 23rd of October, 1623, and this popular opposition to the King's expressed purpose was voiced in spite of the intimidation he had previously attempted in the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of several of the highest officials of the Company. The Company appealed for protection and redress to James's fourth Parliament in May, 1624; but, despite "soft mutterings" of protest heard in that body, the royal mandate that the petition be not considered was obeyed and the Virginia Company was left to its fate.\*

The corporate existence of the Virginia or London Company may be said to have ended with the "*quo warranto*" of Attorney-General Coventry, which came up on the 26th of June, 1624. Nevertheless, Sir Edwin Sandys and his fellow patriots had accomplished their great purpose, and the principles

\* During much of the time that James I was attempting to get control of the Virginia Company, Sandys and Southampton were illegally held in confinement by orders of the King. In 1621, Sandys and Southampton had been placed under arrest by royal authority. Southampton was a member of the House of Lords and Sandys of the House of Commons. The latter body, on the 30th of November, 1621, under motion of Mr. Mallory, had it tersely recorded in the Commons Journal that the House "*misseth Sir Edwin Sandys. Moveth we may know what is become of him.*" On the 11th of December, the House appointed a Committee to go to the home of Sandys in Kent where he was then confined by royal mandate, to "*see what state Sir Edwin Sandys is in, and if he is sick, indeed, to return his answer.*"

of self-government were then established in America, not only at Jamestown but also at Plymouth Rock. In Britain, the "soft mutterings" of the English Parliament over the interference of James I with the liberties of Englishmen became, in 1642, the rumble of open rebellion against Charles I.

## THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN AND COLONIAL AMERICA

In the development of Anglo-American democracy, the freedom of one country has ever acted and reacted upon the growth of liberty in the other; and this law has held good, without real interruption, in colonial union, in open conflict, in mutual independence, and, finally, in the culmination of a practical alliance in 1917 against an alien autocracy reaching out for world dominion. Because of the falsifications of such writers as John Smith, Samuel Purchas, and Nathaniel Butler, the character, courage, and abilities of the colonists at Jamestown and the purposes of the Patriot Party in England have been much misunderstood. On the other hand, only a portion of the true history of the activities of this Party, as given in their records, has been published, and that recently. The deliberate planning, under every imaginable difficulty and danger, of the "Patriots, Lords, Knights, gentlemen, marchants, and others" provided for the Virginia settlement a representative form of government; and the fact that this first colony was established by these Englishmen for political reasons rather than for religious ones should materially enhance the importance of its narrative, in view of the now generally accepted separation, in



liberal governments, of the functions of Church and State.

That she blazed the way for the fullest development of *representative democracy* throughout the world may well be the proudest boast of America. It must ever be remembered, however, that the spirit of this democracy did not spring from American soil but that its earliest growth was in England. Transplanted in America, it flourished on virgin soil, as it could not then grow in the Old World. On the part of the settlers themselves, the expansion of the principles of freedom in America may find figurative comparison with the "parable of the talents," wherein he who was entrusted with the "five talents" went "straightway" and traded with the same and doubled his holdings. When the first permanent English colonists landed at Jamestown in 1607—a place and time, with regard to the political progress of mankind, more momentous than the landing of the great Columbus at San Salvador—they brought with them the memory of each struggle for popular rights already won or, perhaps, temporarily lost in the mother country.

So insistent was the longing for liberty in the English people that they persevered in the first work of colonisation despite the discouragement of a far worse-than-war death rate. This mortality was due chiefly to malarial fever found in the unaccustomed lowlands of the James river, to the importation of the Great Plague then raging in England, and to the

yellow fever which was frequently contracted in the semi-tropical islands visited on the way over. This death rate ran from twenty per cent among the settlers who reached more healthful spots to upwards of ninety per cent of the other colonists who faced a combination of these ills and of Indian massacres as well. Since gold and other valuable minerals were not then found in Virginia, nothing less than a high moral motive could have animated the settlers and held their patriot supporters to the great task they had set for themselves. Captain John Smith, the first royally licensed historian of the colony, expanded upon the sufferings of the colonists, but attributed them almost wholly to the alleged mismanagement of its founders and to its *popular form of government*.\*

\* It was more or less natural that James I should attempt absolute control of his subjects in America through his duly appointed agents. For over a century, the rulers and grandees of Spain and Portugal had been enriching themselves through the exploitation of their own colonists as well as of the native Indians. Almost at the spot where the Jamestown colony landed, the Spanish had attempted a much larger colony. It was abandoned probably more from the failure to find gold and silver than for other reasons, such as the fierce hostility of the Indians, together with a climate much more rigorous than that of the Spanish colonies farther South. Like the Spaniards, James wanted gold; and his agent, John Smith, sought diligently for it. The Virginia colonists and their supporters also hoped for gold, but they realised that they could secure something in the New World infinitely more precious than gold—a larger measure of liberty than they had ever had before. This became the expanding inheritance of the “five talents” of the British colonists, “talents” which were not entrusted to the less fortunate emigrants from Spain, Portugal, and France.

Smith, as the servant of the king, represented that all went well with Virginia when the king's plans were administered by Smith himself, and that the settlers had always dismally

Fortunately for the cause of liberty in America, James I died only a few months after he had an-

failed without him; but it must also be remembered that he had landed in irons and under a charge of inciting a mutiny on the way to America. When, however, the king's secret orders were opened, it was found that James had made him a member of the Virginia Council. After two stormy years in Virginia, in which he unjustly called the ablest leaders among the settlers "tiffity-taffety" incompetents, he was sent back to England by Archer, Ratcliffe, and Martin to "answere some misdemeanors," among which was an alleged plotting with the savages to surprise and cut off his rival for the Presidency, Captain Francis West, and a party of colonists which West had led up the James river.

Failing to secure further employment from the Patriot Party in control of the Virginia Company in London, this bold explorer and excellent map-maker volunteered to lead the Pilgrim Fathers to their Promised Land. The Pilgrims, however, incontinently rejected the doughty Captain's offer, which seems to show clearly that this second group of would-be Americans would also, as far as possible, be unhampered by an agent of autocracy. Afterwards, Captain Smith asserted, with characteristic modesty, that the Pilgrims would have been "spared a wonderful deal of misery" if they had not held that "my books and maps were much better cheap than myself to teach them."

Before landing, the Pilgrim Fathers signed an immortal instrument for self-government; yet they, like the Virginians, felt impelled, at first, to keep to some of the swaddling clothes thought proper for them by the king and such as Captain Smith. When, like the Virginians, after two years' trial, they flung these things off, they began to prosper greatly. The Pilgrims, indeed, attempted to carry out the same communistic scheme which had failed in the very beginnings of Jamestown. By this plan, all the settlers contributed to and drew from a common store or supply. The Plymouth settlers, like those at Jamestown, were forced to abandon this communistic procedure, and Governor Bradford wrote that after he had, in 1623, done away with the system of holding property in common and had "assigned to every family a parcel of land," a new spirit was shown by the settlers. They all became very industrious and "more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any other could use." He added that experience with the communal plan "tried sun-

nulled the patent of the Virginia Company, under whose auspices and encouragement *two* self-governing colonies of Englishmen had been established in America; for the Plymouth settlement, which followed in 1620, provided an independent territorial extension for the exercise of self-government in America. Moreover, this second colony profited by the example and, in a large measure, avoided the early mistakes of the first settlement. Both groups of settlers showed, from the beginning, their independence of spirit and the progressive character of their ideas. The Virginians, with financial endowment from the mother country, established a free school and a college for the education of the natives shortly after the meeting of the first representative assembly in 1619; and Harvard, in New England, was established in 1636, within a like period of time after the landing of the settlers there.\*

dry years, and that amongst godly and sober men, showed clearly the vanity of a system which was found to breed much confusion and discontent."

\* The educational plans of the Virginia colonists were indefinitely put off by the great Indian Massacre of 1622. The noble-hearted George Thorpe, in charge of the education of the natives, was warned of their proposed treachery, but he refused to believe it. Shortly after this massacre, some of the surviving Virginia colonists carried sorely-needed supplies of food to their compatriots at Plymouth. The Captain of their ship, John Huddleston, warned the Pilgrims of similar danger from the Indians. Captain Huddleston may have been acquainted with Shakespeare's dramas, and possibly with Shakespeare himself, for he began his warning thus: "*Friends, countrymen and neighbors . . .* Bad news doth spread itself too far." Continuing, he added: . . . "Yet I will so far inform you that myself, with many good friends in the south colony of Virginia, have received such a blow, that 400 per-



The evidence of the co-operation of the settlers with the patriot group of founders in England is most interesting. When Sandys and his associates were struggling to preserve the Company in London, the Governor, Council, and Burgesses in Virginia testified to the beneficent results accruing to the Colony under popular management. When Sir John Harvey and the other members of the Royal Commission \* of investigation reached Virginia, they asked the Burgesses to subscribe to a statement expressing their consent to the establishment of royal control. The Assembly, however, returned the paper unsigned, accompanied by the statement: "When our consent to the surrender of the Patents shall be required, will be the most propitious [time] to make reply; in the meantime, we conceive his Majesties intention of changing the government *hath proceeded from much misinformation*,"—"misinformation" which has long persisted, owing to King James's diligent suppression of free speech and his autocratic control of all "public prints." The Assembly then addressed a letter to the King in which they prayed that their liberal institutions might not be destroyed and the old Smith faction of the Company placed over them again.†

sons will not make good our losses. Therefore, I do intreat you (although not knowing you) that the old rule which I learned when I went to school, may be sufficient. That is, 'Happy is he whom other men's harm doth make to beware.'"

\* See p. 30.

† The royalist-inclined faction led by Sir Thomas Smith is here meant. The Assembly even refused to let the King's Commission see a copy of this letter and other similar documents. When it was discovered that acting Secretary Edward

When Charles I ascended the English throne as the second Stuart king imbued, like his predecessor, with the dogma of divine right, he owed some debts for certain favours received from members of the patriot party in England; and, for a time, Sir Edwin Sandys had hopes of the development of a more liberal spirit in him than had been shown by his father. But selfish or designing counsellors were at court, and it is not improbable that Spanish spies again played their part in arousing royal jealousies of the proceedings of the patriot group. By 1625, popular discontent had greatly increased in Britain, and Charles I was obliged, in addition, to deal with two independently inclined colonies in North America, whereas James had had to deal with but one. The spirit of democracy had become triple-headed, and threefold as threatening to autocracy as before; for James I, in endeavouring to extricate himself from a double difficulty with the Virginia Company and a "seditious Parliament," had, partly through patriot design and partly by chance, created in the New England settlements a further source of trouble. This third source of controversy between the divine right of kings and the rights of the people was not sufficiently developed to merit the attention of James in the last years of his reign, but it was destined to add enormously to the difficulties of his successors.

Sir Edwin Sandys may properly be regarded as also the author of this new menace to autocracy and as Sharpless had secretly given copies to a member of the Commission, he was punished by being "sent to the Pillorie," with the loss of "a part of one of his eares."

the Founder of the Second and Separate Extension of Anglo-American Democracy in the New World. It had so happened that Sir Edwin, who was a champion of religious toleration as well as of political freedom, well knew the courage and character of John Robinson, the pastor of the Separatist Congregation exiled in the Netherlands. Robinson had been one of those English clergymen who had been driven from their original pastorates by James I. He had, however, found a refuge in the house of William Brewster, then living on the estate of Sir Edwin Sandys' brother. When the Pilgrims applied to the Virginia Company for a grant of land in the Virginia Colony, their proposition was cordially endorsed by the Patriot Party under the leadership of Sandys. Not only did these Separatists obtain their patent from the Company, but Sandys, in disfavour with the king, persuaded his friends to try to secure a promise from his majesty that the proposed settlement would not be molested. This James would not promise, but the English exiles in the Netherlands represented themselves as being content with obtaining the patent only. They were persuaded, by the logic of many precedents, that "a seale as hard as the house floor" would not hold an autocrat to any agreement he might be pleased to make.\*

\* "He [Chancellor von Bethmann-Holweg] said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree. . . . just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. . . . Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate



If the original intentions of the Virginia Company and of the Pilgrims had been carried out, the latter would have added to the settlement and strength of democracy within the bounds of the Virginia Colony; but, by an accident or incident of navigation, they landed on the wintry coast of New England, whence the commander of the vessel refused to take them to their promised destination. Therefore, the patent secured under the Virginia Company became invalidated as being out of the jurisdiction of the parent corporation. Hence it was that the principles of self-government were separately extended to the new Colony through the famous "Compact" drawn up on the *Mayflower*.

Sir Edwin Sandys, as the leading Founder of Anglo-American democracy, had, geographically at least, builded better than he knew. As the guiding spirit of the Virginia Company and as counsellor, friend, and patron of the Pilgrim emigrants, he led the way in securing a great territorial extension for the prac-

the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?'

—*Report of Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, 1914.*

Cf., also, the maxim of Frederick the Great, greatest of the House of Hohenzollern: "Do not be ashamed of making interested alliances from which you yourself can derive the whole advantage. Do not make the foolish mistake of not breaking them when you believe your interests require it."

tice of self-government in America; and from this Massachusetts settlement were destined to spring the "first written constitution" of the Connecticut colony and the religious freedom of the Rhode Island offshoot. It may truthfully be said of Sandys that no man in history had greater vision and none began a labour fraught with more beneficent results for human liberty. One hundred and fifty years before Jefferson pictured what free Anglo-America should be, Sandys worked for it; and three hundred years before the present association of peoples in the British Commonwealth, Sir Edwin was doubtless discussing some of its basic principles with Bacon, Southampton, Shakespeare, and the Ferrars, within sight of the Royal Arch at Aldersgate, built and dedicated to an autocrat who insisted upon the divine right of kings.

The Great Experiment more than proved its worth to liberty-loving Englishmen; so that, for the next century and a half, liberty-seeking settlers thronged the coast of the North American Continent. There followed, in rapid succession to the foundations at Jamestown and Plymouth Rock, the establishment of religious toleration by the Calverts in Maryland, which barely anticipated that established by Roger Williams in Rhode Island. New York, at first under Dutch control, became the "melting pot" of many peoples. Pennsylvania set an example of fair dealings with the natives; and Oglethorpe opened Georgia as a refuge for honest men oppressed by the harsh laws of that day and generation, which William Penn himself, afterwards imprisoned for debt, would fain have

enjoyed. Again, when the royal will attempted to put into effect a feudal system of "lords, landgraves, and caciques," called by John Locke the "Grand Model," Carolinians, on the free soil of America, would have none of it. In 1642, Englishmen rose against the intolerable tyranny of Charles I and overthrew with him the dogma of divine right; but Englishmen in the Virginia colony had, seven years before, summarily deposed their royal governor in the person of Sir John Harvey. In the New England colonies, English settlers clung to their liberal charters and determined to maintain their rights "by peaceful means, if possible, but forcibly if they must." And three Stuart autocrats failed to bring these "obstinate people" into dutiful submission. Whether Englishmen went abroad or stayed at home, they kept up a never ceasing struggle for liberty,—for self-government and popular privileges in the Colonies, or for a more popular form of government at home.

When Parliaments in England procrastinated over the king's demands and sought to obtain popular privileges in return for taxes, they did what the colonial assemblies in America at one time or another had done or were doing with their royal or their proprietary governors. In both countries, there were periods of apparent retrogression. When, however, there appeared the autocratic Governor Berkeley in Virginia, oppressive orders in Massachusetts, or a Governor Tryon in North Carolina, a Bacon arose in the first colony, an Otis in the second, and a band of "Regulators" in the third. Always the sum of the

forward movements exceeded those of the periods of retrogression.

In Britain, the Great Rebellion of 1642 against royal rule was succeeded by the restoration of a Stuart King in 1660; but Charles II, whatever his blunders, was careful, at least, not to insist upon a divine right to govern. "He who never said a foolish thing nor ever did a wise one" was shrewd enough to know that this dogma had been discarded in England, at least, though the throne itself had been restored. The Restoration of 1660 was followed by the Revolution of 1688. The latter did not do away with the king, but it substituted, in the place of an undesirable monarch, one more acceptable to Anglo-Celtic freemen.\*

\* The union of the Celt and the Anglo-Saxon was fortunate for both races in that the best qualities of either were complementary to the other. As a recognition of the contribution of the Celt to the union, the term *Anglo-Celtic* may well be used in place of the less accurate though more common hyphenate *Anglo-Saxon*. The rougher characteristics of the Teuton emigrant on Britain's soil became softened by the more emotional and imaginative temperament of the Celt. English history seems to show that when these races have harmoniously mingled, government, literature, religion, and the whole social structure have been benefited thereby. Sir Edwin Sandys and William Shakespeare were Anglo-Celtic, and we cannot picture them as being so gifted without this union of the races in their blood. Their ideals were forced to find some way to burst the bonds of mediæval custom; and to them America became the Land of Opportunity, or in their own words, a "providence cast before them." Thomas Jefferson, also of Anglo-Celtic ancestry, was, in the New World, the political descendant of Sir Edwin Sandys, as well as the blood relative of liberal Englishmen who suffered death or imprisonment under the Stuart kings.

Perhaps it is due to the influence of the Celt that the English-speaking peoples have ever referred to the land of their origin



In America, "every school boy knows" something, at least, of the later struggle for popular liberty in the thirteen English colonies under the several governors or other agents appointed by the British kings. He knows, also, that ultimately a British king went so far in his reactionary policies that the colonies declared their complete independence of the mother country. On the other hand, a volume has recently been written \* to show how little the school boy learns of the dual nature of the struggle, of mutual misunderstanding, and of the widespread sympathy in Britain with American ideals, together with the suppressed popular opposition to the temporary ascendancy of autocratic methods in Great Britain. True, a wise provision of an unofficial board of national examiners causes the prospective college student to prepare a digest of the speech by Edmund Burke on Conciliation; but the student learns to think of this speech, in most cases, as the opinion of a single liberal-minded member of the British Parliament and not as an expression of the popular opposition to the course of the "personally controlled" government of George III and a Parliament which was then elected by the merest fraction of the population.

as the *Mother Country*, whereas the Teutonic peoples have referred to theirs as the *Fatherland*.

\* Altschul: *The American Revolution in our School Text-Books*.

## AUTOCRACY SEVERS THE BONDS OF POLITICAL UNION

The struggle of the English people for popular rights against autocratic rule was carried on in America as in England. In the colonies, however, the people, by virtue of the precedent secured by their Great Charter of 1609, and because, also, of their very distance from the seat of royal authority, developed and practised a greater measure of self-government than was then possible in Britain. Restrictive trade laws were laid upon them, both by the Parliament under the Commonwealth and by later Parliaments under royal authority, but these laws were, in the main, unenforced. As a sidelight of history it is worth noting that nearly all the Revolutionary leaders of the first or Virginia colony, for example, were either descendants of members of the Patriot Party in England or of those who took an active part in the institution of free government in America. In Great Britain, on the other hand, it is an interesting fact that three members of the minority of the House of Lords who supported the patriot party in America in 1775 were the Dukes of Devonshire, Portland, and Northumberland. These peers were descendants of the Earl of Southampton, who, as the trusted friend of Sandys and the other patriot founders of America, succeeded Sandys after the mandate of the king to the Company: "*Choose the Devil if you will, but not Sir Ed-*

*win Sandys.*” The saying that a man’s education begins a hundred years or more before he is born has never been more aptly illustrated than in the case of these American patriot descendants of liberal English ancestors. The political forms of English and of American representative democracy are likewise descended from the same stock; and, in their separate developments, they have maintained their relationship and points of resemblance, although, in 1776, the family ties were broken.\*

The Dukes of Devonshire, Portland, and Northumberland, true to their inheritance from the patriot Earl of Southampton and, consequently, to their political sympathies with Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and the American patriot party, voted with the opposition to the autocratic George III. The open opposition of these men and that of Burke, Barré, Pitt, and Fox voiced the otherwise *inarticulate* popular opposition of a large body of Englishmen who, at that time, had no part in the government and whose *petitions* to Parliament on behalf of Anglo-American lib-

\* “In spite of the controversies which have at times raged between the two peoples, we speak the same language as the English; our customs have been fashioned after theirs; our legal procedure has been founded upon theirs; their ideas of government and their conception of liberty are ours as well. In spite of the wars we have fought against them, we have never thought of turning to any other nation as a model for what is most essential in our public and private life. Many nationalities have been brought together in this melting pot; but the influence of all other nations remains negligible compared to that of England. She is, after all, the Mother Country, from whom we have acquired what really counts in the long run: language, customs, political liberty, tradition!”

—Altschul: *The American Revolution in our School Text-Books.*



erties went unheeded. The expressions of the leaders of the English patriot party in the Parliaments of George III were much louder than the "soft mutterings" heard on behalf of the American settlers in the Parliaments of James I, but they were not strong enough to restrain the course of the last king of Britain who dared assert a personal rule, even though he did not claim for that rule a divine origin as in the case of his Stuart predecessors.\*

On going back over the Revolutionary struggle in

\* It is one of the hopeful signs of the times that the business men of America are beginning to take an active interest in the investigations of history. Not only will the subject of history be benefited by an "interchange of theory and practice"; but the future policies of the Nation may be shaped to greater advantage if based upon a more general and better understanding of the past. Much of the earlier American history from which we have drawn our impressions of the Revolutionary conflict and of events of international import since that period has not been consciously partisan, but it has been based on evidence, in a double sense, partial. The result has given the American people a somewhat provincial viewpoint, which easily becomes, under the expanding influence of a certain kind of patriotic teaching or of "Fourth of July oratory," very largely chauvinistic, or, in more popular phraseology, good American "buncombe." The comparatively recent researches of original investigators of the type of Sydney George Fisher and others must very materially modify the interpretation of Colonial history and the Revolutionary period. As in the case of all reformers, Mr. Fisher has been attacked as having gone too far; but, whether he went too far or not, his work has already had a very profound influence upon historical perspective and proportion. In like manner, the brief monographs of Charles Francis Adams have helped in the overthrow of error. These writers are especially mentioned because it may be said of them that neither had followed the study of history as a vocation. In yet another instance, an intensive experience in the broadening sphere of international trade may have inspired the recent investigations of George Louis Beer, through whose findings a flood of new light has been shed upon intercolonial relations and British colonial policies.

the light of this evidence, it would seem that even the autocratic government of George III had grievances, and some degree of right on its side. If George III was stupid, he and his ministers were probably sincere in their efforts to govern wisely, according to their interpretation. They were ignorant of actual conditions. They did not, and possibly could not, understand how far representative democracy in America had gone in the matter of self-government. There was nothing like it in Europe, so that they had near them no standard of measurement for the practical developments that followed the evolution of local management of colonial affairs. Not without justice, the British ministry had much in mind the defence of her colonies against the otherwise overwhelming hostility of Spain and the successive efforts for world dominion by an autocratic France. The British Government had held and was holding the Colonies united through the common bond of race and origin. Because of this aid towards union and therefore greater strength, the British government felt that a very definite service had been rendered, for it was known that the colonists entertained very strong jealousies among themselves. On some occasions, only the tact and earnest efforts of British officials restrained the Colonies from engaging in disastrous and possibly fatal disputes with each other. Furthermore, the patience of the British ministry was tried to the utmost by reason of the fact that, in time of war, many American merchants, ship-owners, and seamen profited greatly by furnishing the common enemy with food

and supplies; and that, when apprehended, it was almost impossible to convict the offenders before any judge or jury that sat in America.

On the other hand, if the thirteen Colonies had been united and efficient in defending themselves, and if they had offered to provide a minimum payment of their share of the expense incurred by the mother country in protecting them against the French and Indians, there might have been no open breach. The British ministry was doubtless aware, also, that two-thirds of the American people were indifferent or actually opposed to the attitude and acts of what was regarded as the radical element in America. A large proportion of the Americans believed with Fairfax, the friend and patron of George Washington, that matters of difference between the colonies and the mother country could and would be adjusted in due time; that it was a mistake or even a wrong, to destroy or confiscate private property, as in the matter of the tea; and that it was a serious error to extol as martyrs men who, in the so-called "Boston Massacre," had fallen in making a mob attack upon the soldiers of the Government.

Nevertheless, the protests of the patriot minority in America must have seemed reasonable, or there would not have been such a large proportion of the British people who were not in harmony with the policies of the Government. Later, when war began, this opposition extended to the British Army and Navy. Many officers resigned their commissions rather than fight against their countrymen in America, and others

prosecuted the war in such a half-hearted manner that at times they helped rather than harassed the patriot party. They hoped that time and circumstances would bring about a compromise or some adjustment of Anglo-American differences. Such a compromise was finally offered by the British Government, but it was refused by the Americans, who had then declared for independence.

After the American Revolution had run its course and had brought about a result much more radical than the British Revolution of the preceding century, peace came through the recognition by the British Government of the independence of thirteen "Sovereign States"; but, for many years, there were British statesmen and not a few Americans who believed that the loosely knit Confederation of States could not stand alone and that the two English-speaking peoples would reunite under a single flag. Furthermore, the people of both countries felt certain immediate disadvantages in separation. For example, the former colonists felt that it was a great grievance that they were no longer the beneficiaries of special trade relations with the West Indies, while British merchants experienced losses in trade with America.



## ORIGIN OF POLITICAL MISUNDERSTANDING IN HISTORICAL MISCONCEPTIONS

It was perhaps natural that the American people should soon cease to distinguish between the autocratic government of George III, which prosecuted the war, and the British people, who very generally opposed it.\* In Great Britain, it was more or less to be expected that an aristocratic or Tory element should despise the upstart Republic with its "dangerously radical" ideas about equality and fraternity—ideas that led first to republican excesses in France, followed by a military autocracy under Napoleon. It was natural, also, for Americans, in terms quite out of proportion to the whole truth, to contrast in the press, the school, the text-book, and the pulpit the sufferings and lofty idealism of the Revolutionary patriots with the arrogance of the British Government and the misdeeds of British soldiers and the mercenary troops supplied by a number of the petty autocrats of Central Europe.†

\* The Declaration of Independence, as drawn up by Jefferson, is not an arraignment of the British people, but of their Government as then constituted. Cf. Jefferson's attitude toward the British Government when that Government suggested an alliance with the United States for the protection of American democracy. See p. 67.

† It is sometimes forgotten that "Hessian" has become, in American history, a conveniently comprehensive term for all the mercenary troops whose services were sold to the British Government by their respective rulers.

A small volume has lately been written on "Breaches of Anglo-American Treaties." The book is based on fact; and, if it were the whole truth, it would indicate that there has been little good faith and much sharp dealing between the English-speaking democracies as representatives of the most highly developed and powerful types of governments of the people, by the people, and for the people. On the other hand, there are great volumes of records and an immensity of evidence to show that, of all governments, the British and the American constitute those that have been most in direct contact and yet have most successfully lived together, if not always in perfect amity, at least in a beneficent state of international peace.

It is true that certain parts of the very first treaty between Great Britain and the United States were promptly broken by the former; but it is equally true that some of the provisions of the same treaty were, from the start, disregarded by the United States, not because of bad faith, but because of inability on the part of the first Federal Government to compel the individual States to fulfil the terms of an international agreement.

Notwithstanding this double breach of the treaty of 1783, Anglo-American peace prevailed until some time after Great Britain became involved in a war against the world-dominion plans of Napoleon Bonaparte. It was a remarkable chain of circumstances which led, in 1812, the newly-established American Republic to fight, not in actual alliance, but at least by the side of the most dangerous military power of the day against

a nation fighting in defence of the principles of political freedom. In America, historical prejudices and misconceptions, aggravated by ultra-patriotic teachings, had already played their part in obscuring the greater issues; but tactless obstinacy on the part of the British ministry and arrogant aggression on the part of British naval officers contributed in forcing the peacefully-inclined American government into an unnatural and unnecessary war which, had the American Republic been stronger, might have enabled the autocratic Napoleon to carry out his designs against the freedom of nations.\*

\* In spite of the accustomed outcry against Great Britain, there were Americans who saw in the military aggression of a misguided France under Bonaparte a more far-reaching menace, in principle, at least, than the arrogant disregard of Great Britain towards the rights claimed by the United States for American seamen. Thomas Jefferson has been accused of cowardice in advocating the Non-Importation Acts rather than a declaration of war against Great Britain. In this matter, Jefferson has been misunderstood. He had dared to declare war against the "Barbary Powers" of North Africa when the most powerful European nations were paying yearly tribute to these Mohammedan governments. Presidents Washington and Adams also had thought it best to purchase immunity for American commerce. Washington had written in old-style diplomatic terms to the young Emperor of Morocco on his accession: "*Receive, great and good friend, my sincere sympathy with you in that loss*"; i.e., the loss of "*the late Emperor, your father, and our friend of glorious memory*." The pronouncedly original Jefferson wanted then to do away with this "fine language" and talk to the Barbary rulers in the terms of big guns. Jefferson was not afraid of war with Great Britain, but he was unwilling to fight on the side of an autocratic France when he thought he could gain his ends with the British Government by peaceful means. Evidence has now come to light in the London archives to show that the commercial pressure exerted by Jefferson was having its effect and must have obtained results in the reform of British foreign



In the struggle with Napoleon, the political existence of Great Britain depended upon her continued control of the sea. She had need of all her manpower; but, in American ports, she lost crew after crew by desertion. American wages were higher, and there were Americans at every wharf ready with inducements to British sailors to desert battleship, merchant-ship, and country. In this matter, Americans felt that they were doing a good service in smiting their traditional foe by crippling her trade and war-strength. Napoleon Bonaparte, with an autocrat's characteristic contempt for scraps of paper, had treacherously seized American ships in European ports; yet this was forgotten or ignored when Great Britain began to insist on the alleged right of search and impressment, in her efforts to regain her sailors. British bungling and high-handed seizures of American seamen followed, together with the famous Orders in Council, which led to the American declaration of war. Even then, Anglo-American peace might have remained unbroken, if, by an Atlantic cable, a later combination of American genius and enterprise and British capital, the news of Great Britain's withdrawal of her Orders in Council could have reached America before the first blows were struck. Napoleon's orders of like character were not withdrawn,

policy but for the opposition to the Non-Intercourse Acts in America itself. This American opposition and the frequent evasion of the Acts caused these measures to be withdrawn just as the British importers and manufacturers were, apparently, at least, about to force their Government to yield the point at issue.

and war might ultimately have been declared against the French Empire instead, with Great Britain as an ally in a world-wide struggle for freedom from the domination of a military power.

## THE DAWN OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PEACE

The treaty of Ghent in 1814 followed a war, which, from the American standpoint, resulted in unexpected naval successes; in both disasters and victories on land; and in the revelation of considerable disunion sentiment in some of the States, from which the British received secret aid and to which they looked for actual co-operation if the war continued. This second treaty between America and Great Britain was indecisive in its terms and, in the main, unsatisfactory to both countries. Had it been made between less popular governments, both sides would have begun at once exhaustive and exhausting preparations for another struggle. In America the exact opposite happened. Two democracies, broadly termed Canada, on the one side, and the United States, on the other, found themselves, in irritated mood, facing each other on a boundary line, the extent of which would stagger even the governments of Europe to find means to fortify. As the war went on, and after it was finished, both sides were frantically engaged in building battleships to secure supremacy on the Great Lakes; and America was dangerously near emulating for all time the militarism of Europe.

But some one stopped to consider. Perhaps there were many who simultaneously stopped to consider what all this military preparation would mean to the

future of the two peoples. As the immediate result of this forethought and liberal statesmanship, the dual preparation for naval supremacy on the Great Lakes was suspended, and an agreement was reached which provided that both nations should dismantle what war vessels they had already built, and that henceforth no armed vessels should be maintained on the Lakes above a certain specific armament necessary for police purposes. It was also agreed that there should be no fortifications constructed on the three thousand miles of border line.

The men who conceived and executed this historic agreement that removed, apparently forever, a military menace and burden from two peoples, but lately at war with each other, should be honoured with a monument built upon the international boundary line. Moreover, it should be remembered that this agreement was drawn up and carried out in good faith, despite the remains of some particular prejudices among the Canadian people against the United States, due largely to the immigration to that country of large numbers of British Loyalists who were driven out of the United States during, and subsequent to, the Revolutionary War.

Near the close of the War of 1812, the United States had won successes on land at Baltimore and Plattsburg in September, 1814; but Jackson's amazing victory over Wellington's veterans in the battle of New Orleans caused the British "Tory" element to have an increased respect for "radical" American democracy. At the same time, that victory gave a somewhat un-

fortunate boost to American "bumptiousness" and feeling of self-sufficiency, from which the nation is now beginning to recover as it becomes an active participant in the arena of world politics and policies. This "bumptiousness"—its persistency, and its permeation from the popular imagination upwards into official life, has shown interesting outcroppings on several occasions during the century of Anglo-American peace.

If Great Britain, even one hundred years ago, had been an aggressive military power, or if she had been autocratically quick to take offence, she had ample excuse for such a course in 1818, at a time when she was not, as in 1812-1815, engaged in battle in Europe. It is highly probable, indeed, that she would not have permitted the incident that then took place to be closed with any power but the United States without recourse to arms to secure reparation for the execution of British subjects in neutral territory in time of peace. On the part of America, it was not only "shirt-sleeve diplomacy," but drum-head disregard of international law as well. In brief, the "hero of New Orleans" had at that time invaded Spanish territory in Florida to avenge Indian invasions from that quarter. Finding that Alexander Arbuthnot, a Scotchman of education and ability, and his British employé, Robert Ambrister, had aided the Indians, Jackson very promptly hanged the employer, and later ordered the employé shot—a difference in the form of their execution appreciated by military men, while the latter's more honourable fate must have especially

aroused his sense of gratitude to the American commander! When the news of this American aggression reached Britain, press and people demanded an immediate vindication of the nation's outraged honour. The British Government was almost swept off its feet into action before full official information had arrived. It was then learned on what grounds Jackson had acted, and although Great Britain regarded Jackson's act as unusual and high-handed, it could not approve of Arbuthnot's course, and the incident caused no clash between the two governments.



## ANGLO-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY CONFRONTS THE FORCES OF PAN-EUROPEAN AUTOCRACY

During the sixteenth century, it had been the ardent hope of Philip II of Spain to force all the people of the world under the control of a group of autocrats who should rule by "divine right." In 1815, this dream seemed about to be realised. The Republic of France had, in twenty-five years, fallen under the spell of Napoleon and then, through external pressure, the nation had been "restored" to a member of the Bourbon family, the former despoilers of both land and people. At this time, the Russian Czar, the Prussian King, the Austrian Emperor, and eventually the French King, entered into an agreement called by them the "Holy Alliance." This "Holy Alliance" was, by the combined strength of its enslaved peoples, to stamp out popular liberty everywhere. The people of Russia were called upon to suppress the liberty of the people of Poland; the people of Austria were commanded to beat back a rising tide of democracy in Italy; and the people of once-republican France were engaged in crushing the spirit of revolt against "divine rule" in Spain. In Europe, autocracy was overwhelmingly triumphant. Even republican Switzerland had, for a time, succumbed to the apparently irresistible forces of reaction. There were,



nevertheless, in the minds of the members of the "Holy Alliance," three sources of disquietude.

During the European upheaval which had resulted in the downfall of Napoleon, the colonies of Spain in South America had broken from the control of the mother country, and had established their own forms of government. It was, therefore, proposed by Czar Alexander of Russia, King Frederick William of Prussia, and Emperor Francis of Austria that by divine right and "in accordance with the Gospel of Jesus Christ," they should unite in helping Ferdinand VII to recover his lost possessions. With democracy ruthlessly crushed in continental Europe by 1823, it seemed a comparatively easy matter to send an irresistible force across the seas and restore "divine rulership" over the weak and ill-prepared republics of South America.

But the second, and by far the greatest, cause for apprehension lay at their own doors. Alexander, Frederick William, and Francis had not conferred with the King of England for the awkward reason that the British ruler had, like his predecessors for nearly two hundred years, abandoned "divine right" theories, together with many of his royal prerogatives. It had become necessary for King George IV to consult the free representatives of at least some proportion of his people before war was declared for any purpose against any other people; and, even if George IV had been willing, any frank public discussion of the more personal ideas of the "Holy Alliance" would prove distinctly embarrassing, if not

fatal, to the success of its plans.\* Great Britain had previously joined forces with the continental rulers to preserve herself and to overthrow the all-threatening autocracy of Napoleon; but the "Holy Alliance" could not expect her free people to help overthrow the freedom of others. Indeed, Alexander, Frederick William, Francis, Louis, and Ferdinand held that Great Britain was very little better than a much-detested republic. These rulers felt that it was most unfortunate to have so many of the principles of democracy established so near at hand; but the British were considered "slow and stupid" so that if their government did not actively interfere, the South American plans of the "Holy Alliance" could be carried out.

A third source of misgiving lay in the apparently successful establishment of democracy in the United States. That, however, was a very distant annoyance which could be attended to in due time. Except for the disturbing example the North American Republic had set to the plain people of their own countries, the influence and "undisciplined" power of the

\* "I think the sentence in American history that I myself am proudest of is that in the introductory sentences of the Declaration of Independence, where the writers say that a due respect for the opinion of mankind demands that they state their reasons for what they are about to do. I venture to say that decent respect for the opinion of mankind demanded that those who started the present European War should have stated their reasons, but they did not pay any heed to the opinion of mankind, and the reckoning will come when the settlement comes."

—Woodrow Wilson, June, 30, 1916.

Cf. *Statement of William II at Koenigsberg, Aug. 25, 1910, p. 18, footnote.*

United States was negligible. Besides, argued these autocrats of the "Holy Alliance," America and Britain had just emerged from the second armed conflict of the past half century. They further observed, with especial satisfaction, that the American people, who held the power and who swayed their government, appeared to dislike the British people and government above any other people and government on earth. Therefore, the autocrats of the "Holy Alliance" and their advisers did not even consider the possibility of these two apparently hostile peoples making common cause against their private designs.

There stood out, however, in irreconcilable opposition, against Philip II's dream of world autocracy an obstacle which may be personified as Thomas Jefferson's dream of the world-progress of popular government. Translated into action by the forces of autocracy on the one side and the steadily expanding principles and ideals of democracy on the other, the whole world was to be shaken in irrepressible conflict. Jefferson's "world-dream" of human liberty and America's actual achievement had been derived directly from the political heritage given to America by Sir Edwin Sandys and the English Founders of Anglo-American liberty. From the time he fell heir to that endowment, the success of the Anglo-American in developing the principles of representative self-government had been watched with increasing interest, so that his example inspired Englishmen in the mother country, and became, also, the hope of the liberals of other lands.

On the other hand, in 1823, with European autocracy united, powerful, and aggressive, Pan-American democracy was seriously threatened. But the unexpected happened. The plans of the partners in the "Holy Alliance" were openly denounced by the free representatives of the British people; and Great Britain proposed to President Monroe, through George Canning, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, an alliance with the United States in order to preserve the independence of the menaced republics of the New World. To those on the European side of the Atlantic, there then appeared what must have seemed to minds running in old or reactionary channels, the astounding spectacle of the "rebel" founders of the new republic, and presumably, therefore, the bitterest enemies of the British Government, rejoice in the prospect of such an alliance. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, without reserve or qualification, united in endorsing this British suggestion. The latter promptly wrote to President Monroe that such co-operation with Great Britain "must ensure success in the event of an appeal to force" on the part of the "Holy Alliance," and that "it doubles the chance of success without that appeal." With a vision looking far beyond historical disagreements or provincial prejudices, the author of the Declaration of Independence forwarded to Monroe an opinion in which his insight into conditions now reads like a prophecy. The nature of this reply is becoming better known through recent publications, yet it bears repetition here, in part, at least:



“The question presented by the letters you have sent me,” wrote Jefferson, “is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence that made us a nation. This sets our compass, and points the course which we are to steer thro’ the ocean of time opening on our view, and never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle in trans-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is labouring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavour should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit. She now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government and emancipate at one stroke a whole continent, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should the most sedulously nourish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even



her amity at the price of taking part in her wars; but the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequences, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and to establish the American system of ousting from our land all foreign nations, of never permitting the powers of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it, and if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent war, instead of provoking it. With Great Britain withdrawn from their side and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not dare to risk war. Nor is the occasion to be slighted, which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy."

In spite, however, of the endorsement of Jefferson and Madison, the proposed alliance was not effected. The designs of Alexander, Frederick William, Francis, and Ferdinand were instead dashed to pieces by the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine with the official approval and support of Great Britain, which support alone gave the American Doctrine weight with the autocratic courts of Europe. In the meantime, Louis of France had been dissuaded by Great

Britain from taking an active part in the proposed Latin-American scheme of the other sovereigns. However much the European autocrats might at that time have scorned the power of the United States, they dared not attempt an invasion of distant America against the wishes of the mighty "mistress of the seas." Therefore, although the suggested Anglo-American plan of alliance, designed to protect the Latin-American republics, and to assure a greater measure of safety to the free governments of the United States and Great Britain, became known as an American policy, it owed its origin and its earliest authority to the spirit of Anglo-Celtic liberty in the people and government of Great Britain.

## A CENTURY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN DISAGREEMENTS SETTLED BY DISCUSSION AND ARBITRATION

In the years that followed, as reactionary British ministers returned at times to power, and as American assertiveness, oratory, and provincial history drove the people of the two nations apart in sympathy, there were periods of serious misunderstanding and mutual jealousies. At one time, indeed, in certain operations in Central America, Great Britain herself, with a government then influenced by powerful business interests, seemed to threaten the integrity of the American Doctrine which she had, indirectly, at least called into being. Again, representatives of a British ministry showed themselves actively interested in keeping the infant Republic of Texas from a proposed union with the United States. In the latter case, however, Great Britain could claim with justice that there seemed to be more politicians in the United States opposed to this union than there were in Great Britain. If Britain had developed misgivings about too great an American expansion in the New World, the northeastern States feared, in even greater measure, that their political prestige and commercial interests would suffer by the addition of such vast new territories in the southwest.\*

\* In 1844, the legislature of Massachusetts resolved that  
“the project of the annexation of Texas, unless arrested at the

American aggressiveness in Anglo-American relations was evident in connection with the *Caroline* incident, in which case popular and local antipathies were displayed against British authority in Canada; and in the Maine and Oregon boundary line disputes, in the discussion of which there were not only popular, but political demonstrations against Great Britain.

The *Caroline* incident owes its terminology to the fact that a vessel of that name was equipped on the American side of the Niagara River to act in co-operation with insurrectionists in Canada. The insurrectionists, aided by Americans, had seized an island and were using this as a base of supplies for raids against the British-Canadian Government. The *Caroline* was finally seized and destroyed by a Canadian force at an American dock. This was as irregular a proceeding as the initial offence; but, under the circumstances, it was, like Andrew Jackson's treatment of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, excused on the basis of retaliation for a previous injury. The incident is unimportant; but the fact that, as in the Jackson-Arbuthnot episode, the two governments settled their grievances without recourse to arms adds its testimony to the admirable side of Anglo-American relations and to the essential similarity of their political threshold, may tend to drive these States into a dissolution of the Union." And again: "That, under no circumstances whatever, can the people of Massachusetts regard the proposition to admit Texas into the Union in any other light than as dangerous to its continuance in peace, in prosperity, and in the enjoyment of those blessings which it is the object of a free government to secure."

ideals in the maintenance of international peace and amity.

Autocratic governments have furnished few examples of open discussion. Their diplomacy is secret; and with them language becomes a camouflage to disguise their thoughts and policies. To these forms of diplomacy the governments of the United States and Great Britain have, in their relations with each other, furnished a marked contrast. For over a century, issues or differences arising between the two countries have been discussed openly. In some cases, indeed, the exchange of opinion between high officials has been so brusque as to stir up dangerous outbursts of popular antagonism. In spite of such outbursts, however, the discussion continued and the difficulties were finally adjusted. The two governments, in definite contrast to those controlled by autocrats, have, at times, proved to be a check on popular belligerency. This is amply illustrated by several events prior to the American War of Secession.

The boundary line between Maine and Canada (New Brunswick) had been but vaguely defined in the Anglo-American treaty of 1783. In 1814, the treaty of Ghent awarded to Great Britain a strip of land claimed by Maine and by Massachusetts as the "Mother State." When the matter came up for settlement under President Jackson, it was referred by the Federal Government to the King of the Netherlands as arbitrator. This international referee decided in favour of the claims of Great Britain. Thereupon, the Legislatures of Maine and Massachusetts declared



that, as far as those States were concerned, if the agreement were ratified by the United States Senate, it would be regarded by them as "null and void."\*

Fortunately, however, the President and the United States were not forced to a decision against Massachusetts and Maine, on the one hand, or Great Britain, on the other, by reason of the unusual course of the British Government, which, in this instance also, showed the most evident sincerity in its effort to remain on friendly terms with America. Accordingly, Great Britain sent to the United States, as special envoy, Lord Ashburton, who had opposed, in 1808, the British Orders in Council, the issuing of which led to the war in 1812. The dispute was finally settled in 1842 by the Webster-Ashburton treaty, in

\* A remarkable situation had thus arisen, both in a national sense and in an international one. It is not known whether President Jackson held, in matters concerning nullification, that "circumstances alter cases," but at least he must have felt that there was some weight in the saying. In the case of nullification and threatened secession in South Carolina, where he had acted with prompt decision, Jackson was swayed by personal emotions as well as by general motives of policy; and it may have been truly said of him that "He loved the Union and hated Calhoun," so that he took steps to credit the former and discredit the latter. Again, in the case of Georgia versus the Federal Government and the dispossessed Cherokees, he had no grievance against Georgia, but a decided antipathy to the Indians. Consequently, he allowed Georgia to defy the United States Supreme Court without rebuke and with apparent personal satisfaction. In the matter of the Maine boundary dispute, the victor at New Orleans was swayed by no particular love for New England, the home of John Adams and the source of much bitter opposition to the War of 1812. On the other hand, he had not forgotten the sabre-cut given him as a boy, in South Carolina, by the British invader of Revolutionary days.

the conduct of which Webster showed great shrewdness in overcoming the opposition of the determined Governor of Maine, while Lord Ashburton displayed so conciliatory a spirit that he was afterwards roundly denounced in Canada for yielding too much to the claims of the United States.\*

Scarcely had the Maine boundary been settled, when peace between the two countries was threatened by the popular cry in the United States for a large part of the "Oregon Territory," then claimed by Great Britain and now embraced in British Columbia. "*Fifty-four forty or fight!*" became the campaign cry of the party that elected Polk in 1844. When Polk became President, however, he illustrated again the principle that democratic governments may provide a check on a popular demand for war. The President did not translate the campaign slogan into action against Great Britain; but, in accordance with the suggestion which had been previously made by President Tyler, he informed the British ambassador, Pakenham, that the forty-ninth parallel would make a satisfactory basis for settlement. Pakenham, however, in a somewhat offensive reply, rejected this proposal. Thereupon, President Polk indicated very

\* Maine refused to discuss the very basis on which Webster proposed an agreement, but the latter showed the Governor of the State an old map which convinced the Governor that the British claims were very nearly justified. Webster promised not to show the map to Lord Ashburton. On the other hand, the British archives held the long-sought map used in the original negotiations of 1782, which confirmed the claims of the United States!

clearly that the United States Government would not discuss the matter further, and called upon Congress to make preparations for sustaining these modified American claims in the Oregon region. Pakenham's refusal, however, was not upheld by the British Government, and, in 1846, the boundary proposed by Presidents Polk and Tyler was, with some slight changes, accepted. Again Great Britain and the United States, in open, if not always amicable discussion, showed the way for a settlement of international difficulties by peaceful methods rather than by an appeal to force.

Opposition to illiberal or autocratic governments has been a characteristic of the Anglo-Celtic peoples. They have also sympathised with the people of other countries when they were struggling for greater freedom and a larger measure of popular rights. This sympathy was perhaps more openly shown in America than in Britain, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. Popular sentiment was frequently reflected in Congress; and the oft-declaired speeches of Clay and Webster on behalf of the struggling Greeks are not the only official or semi-official evidence of the fact that America has ever been the friend as well as the hope of the oppressed. In equal measure, it may be said that autocracy has always feared the development and growing influence of democracy in America; for America first proved the worth of the principle that the State exists for the welfare of the people, in contradistinction to the autocratic doctrine

that the people exist for the welfare of the State.\*

In the decades which marked the various European struggles for popular liberty, America has welcomed, from Poland, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, those who have sought to overthrow an alien yoke, domestic autocracy, or the burden of militarism in all its forms. America welcomed the Polish patriot, Kosciuszko; the Hungarian "rebel," Louis Kossuth; and the German patriot, Carl Schurz, together with thousands of his fellow-countrymen who had struggled

\*Cf. James R. Randall's eulogy of Henry Clay, "the spokesman of the free" in America and in Europe:—

His trumpet-tones re-echoed  
like  
Evangels to the free,  
Where Chimborazo views a  
world  
Mosaic'd in the sea;  
And his proud form shall  
stand erect  
In that triumphal car  
Which bears to the Valhalla  
gates  
Heroic Bolivar.  
He spoke for Greece, and  
freedom flew  
Along her sacred rills,  
Waking the mighty souls that  
slept  
On Marathonian hills;  
While bold Bozzaris launched  
his flag  
Upon the gulf of night,  
And hurled a living thunder-  
bolt  
Against the Ottomite!

Cf., also, Lord Byron's  
"Translation of the War  
Song of the Greeks" in their  
fight against the Turk:—

Sparta, Sparta, why in slum-  
bers  
Lethargic dost thou lie?  
Awake and join thy numbers  
With Athens, old ally!  
Leonidas recalling,  
That chief of ancient song,  
Who saved thee once from  
falling,  
The terrible! the strong!  
Who made that bold diversion  
In old Thermopylæ  
And warring with the Persian  
To keep his country free;  
With his three hundred wag-  
ing  
The battle long he stood,  
And like a lion raging,  
Expired in seas of blood.



in vain against the enveloping grasp of Prussian military autocracy. It has almost been forgotten that in 1853, the year in which Perry opened the ports of Japan, the whole world was startled by the bold action of Captain D. N. Ingraham, another American naval officer, who was stationed in Mediterranean waters at Smyrna. Captain Ingraham learned from the American consul that the commander of an Austrian squadron had seized, in Asia Minor, and was holding prisoner, Martin Koszta, a compatriot of Kossuth. Koszta had taken out "first papers" in America preparatory to becoming a citizen of the United States. From on board the United States Sloop *St. Louis*, Captain Ingraham first courteously asked for the release of Koszta. This was as curtly denied and the information volunteered that Koszta would hang by morning. Ingraham did not waste further words with the representatives of Austrian autocracy; he tersely demanded that Koszta be turned over to him within a definite time or he would open fire. When the hour of the American commander's ultimatum had nearly expired, and Ingraham, with his decks cleared for action, was awaiting, watch in hand, the moment to fire, the haughty representatives of autocracy at last understood and Koszta was released.\*

Such deeds as this and the frequent popular demonstrations of American sympathy for "rebellious subjects" were not regarded with enthusiasm in Eu-

\* Arrangement was made for the transfer of Koszta to the care of the French Consul pending an examination into his claims of citizenship.



ropean capitals; but Ingraham's bold challenge aroused a thrill of response wherever the spirit of democracy found freedom for expression. The workingmen of Great Britain, each contributing a penny, gave the American commander a silver chronometer; and German-Americans of Chicago, who had fled from the grinding military autocracy of the Fatherland, presented him with silver plate and a resolution expressive of their appreciation of his act on behalf of one whom they regarded as a fellow patriot.\*

In regard to British policy, the principal misunderstanding extant in the minds of Americans of the present generation, irrespective of historical teaching, has been the attitude of the British Government towards the United States during the War of Secession. Any sense of grievance held by Americans on this score has comparatively little basis in actual fact, while the concessions made later by Great Britain to American opinion are among the most unusual ever yielded by any great power that was in a position to uphold its contentions. There are three matters of a political character, and an extra-political one, which have been widely referred to as instances of British unfriendliness in connection with Anglo-American re-

\* Prior to the Prussianisation of Germany under Hohenzollern domination, Kant, Schiller, Heine, and Goethe spoke in behalf of liberty and political freedom. Goethe's expression: "Only he earns liberty who daily has to struggle for it," compares favorably with that of John Philpot Curran: "The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance; which condition if he break, servitude is at once the consequence of his crime and the punishment of his guilt."

lations during the conflict for the preservation of the Union.

First, it has been asserted that Great Britain was overhasty in recognising the Confederacy, as a *de facto* government; for, at the time of this recognition, the Federal Government sought to represent the movement in the Southern States as an insurrection without established authority. Nevertheless, whatever the wishes of the Federal Government may have been, and however much based on shrewd political motives, it was clear that the movement in the South had outgrown the bounds of mere insurrection from the first. Besides being by its very nature unlike any struggle possible in Europe, there was no positive Constitutional prohibition against any State reassuming its complete sovereignty; on the contrary, it was widely believed and frequently announced (and denied) in every part of the Union that any State had the right to "resume its complete sovereignty." Instead of promptly moving to suppress the secession movement, the Federal Government, under two Presidents, had permitted, for a period of three months, the formation of an independent Confederation to proceed without interference. The situation had no precedent, and has had no parallel since, unless possibly, the secession of Panama from the union of the United States of Colombia be regarded as bearing some basis for comparison. In the case of the Confederacy, responsible authority never ceased; and, in the various States, the local government was not even changed. The seceding States voluntarily entered a new Union, which

began at once to take up the powers of government delegated to it. When the Federal Government called on the loyal States to enforce its authority in the seceded States and to restore them to the Federal Union, a *de facto* Government had been in operation for several months, and was claiming *de jure* rights. Again, when the Federal Government declared a blockade of the South, it acknowledged the existence of an opposition beyond the stage of an insurrection and it was so acknowledged by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Government of Great Britain in accepting and proclaiming the *de facto* status of the Confederacy, merely forecast the subsequent decision of the highest legal tribunal of the United States.

The demand of Great Britain for the return of the Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, and for an apology for their seizure on board a British vessel, occasioned the most violent anti-British demonstration. This affair presents the second noteworthy complaint against the British Government of this period. In the matter previously discussed, the United States Supreme Court upheld the correctness of the action of Great Britain. In this case, President Lincoln declared the act of Captain Wilkes indefensible and exactly contrary to the contentions of America from the beginning concerning the alleged right of search and impressment, a "right" which Great Britain had not exercised in practice for thirty-five years, and which she had formally and officially abandoned in theory a few years before the American conflict began. In the meantime, however, such was

the hysterical state of public opinion that Congress was persuaded to extend to Captain Wilkes a vote of thanks and to present him with silver plate. If it be pointed out, therefore, that Great Britain began preparations for mobilising her military and naval forces, her action could not, under the circumstances, be considered hasty, or unnatural. When this incident is looked at in the full light of the facts; and it is, thanks chiefly to Lincoln, so regarded to-day, it should be remembered, in addition, that Mason and Slidell met with so cold a reception in London that the former made it a basis of complaint for the entire time he remained in England as the accredited representative of the Confederacy. Neither he nor the officials of his Government received the recognition that both had fully expected to receive. Mason, therefore, assailed the attitude of the British Government as unjust or even hostile to the cause of the Confederacy.\*

The third charge against Great Britain for breaches in the friendly character of Anglo-American relations is embraced under the head of "The *Alabama* Claims." The fact that the United States Government was awarded fifteen million, five hundred thousand dollars damages has been advanced as positive proof that Great Britain was guilty of grave offenses against international law and of ill-disguised official hostility to the Government of the United States.

A complete investigation, however, of this third and

\* Slidell, on the other hand, met with secret encouragement at the French Court. Mason had been a United States Senator from Virginia, while Slidell, although born in New York, had represented Louisiana in a similar capacity.



“most flagrant” act of alleged unfriendliness on the part of Great Britain brings out the fact that so great was the desire of the representatives of that Government to preserve amicable relations with this country that an arbitration agreement was signed, under the terms of which an entirely new principle for damages by a belligerent against a neutral could be applied. Not only was one party (Great Britain) in this action voluntarily subjecting herself to *ex post facto* regulations—to rules established *after the alleged offence had been committed*—but Great Britain ultimately submitted to the application of a ruling which leading legal authorities of the other litigant (the United States) declared, in the opinion of one of them, “had no precedent, and could have no following.”\*

By all precedent in international law and usage, Great Britain could not be held accountable for the depredations of the *Alabama* upon United States

\* These statements are based upon authorities on international law who wrote their opinions within a quarter of a century subsequent to the award of the Geneva Tribunal. It is not in any way contended that the Washington Treaty and the arbitration based upon its provisions have not affected political opinion and tendencies in international custom.

“They [the rules laid down by the Geneva Tribunal] are not binding as permanent and absolute rules on England and the United States: (a) because neither England nor the United States have ever considered them to be so binding: and (b) because, by the treaty that proposed them as temporary rules of action for guidance of a special and exceptional court, their permanent adoption is dependent upon their communication to the great European powers, which communication has never been made. This position is taken by Mr. Fish in his letters to Sir Edward Thornton, of May 8 and September 18, 1876, as communicated by President Hayes in his message to the



shipping. The *Alabama* set out from Liverpool as an unarmed vessel, which later, through private British sources, secured its equipment off the Azores. The vessel was constructed by contract with a private corporation and might have been purchased with equal propriety by the Government of the United States instead of the Confederacy. The Government of the United States, however, was able to construct its own ships, while the Confederacy, as an acknowledged belligerent, presumably with equal rights, was compelled to purchase where it could in foreign markets.\*

The Government of the Confederate States, in contracting for the unarmed *Alabama* did not go so far as the Government of the United States had gone in

Senate of January 13, 1879; and there is no dissent of the British Government recorded."

—Wharton: *A Digest of the International Law of the United States*. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1886.

"It will be at once seen that these rules, though leading immediately to an award superficially favorable to the United States in the large damages it gave, placed limitations on the rights of neutrals greater even than those England had endeavoured to impose during the Napoleonic wars, and far greater than those which the United States had ever previously been willing to concede.

"These rules, repudiated as they have been by the contracting powers, and rejected by all other powers, are to be regarded not only as not forming part of the law of nations, but as not binding either Great Britain or the United States."

—Wharton: *Com. Am. Law*; 244. Cf., also, *Creasy, Twiss, Wheaton, American Law Review*, VII.

\* Secretary Welles had tried to get armed and iron-plated ships from the same firm which constructed the *Alabama*; but the Federal Government, in the belief that the war would soon be over, specified that the vessels should be built within too brief a period for the Lairds—the designers of the *Alabama*—to undertake any promise of delivery.

contracting for several vessels secured during the Revolution from France when France was neutral. On the other hand, thirty-odd years before the War of Secession, when the Spanish Government claimed damages for the depredations of the American-built *Santissima Trinidad*, which had been operating on behalf of the Argentina revolutionists, Mr. Justice Story handed down the decision of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that the United States could not be held responsible for the acts of that vessel after she had been properly commissioned by the belligerent in whose service she was duly engaged. Not only was the *Santissima Trinidad* built in the United states, but the Supreme Court admitted also that the vessel was equipped in the United States; that, with the "expressed approval of the United States Government," she had visited, from time to time, United States ports to procure supplies; that her Argentine commission "was not expressed in the most unequivocal terms," so that, with regard to her career, the vessel had to be judged partly by circumstances and testimony; and that there was even a private suspicion of a "lurking American interest" in the vessel itself.\*

\* The Court affirmed in addition: "A bill of sale is not necessary to be produced nor will the courts of a foreign country inquire into the means by which the title to the property has been acquired." The *Santissima Trinidad* was but one of a number of ships which were built in the United States for service under the belligerent governments of South America.

As Secretary of State under John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay wrote to Rivas y Salmon, June 9, 1827: "If vessels have been built in the United States and afterwards sold to one of

In spite of these facts, the Government of Great Britain, on the complaint of the United States, agreed to discuss the matter before an international tribunal on points which the United States Supreme Court had already declared most positively to be above question on the ground of "the settled practice between nations." By a special arrangement, therefore, the defendant (Great Britain) agreed to stand trial on charges, the validity of which the plaintiff (the United States) had previously refused to admit and afterwards refused to acknowledge as applicable to any future proceedings in which she might be a party.

In the opinion of the Confederate Government, the British rulings and policy had markedly favoured the Federal belligerent. As an illustration, it may be cited that, according to the regulations laid down by the British Government, both belligerents were forbidden to bring naval captures to British ports for adjudication by duly constituted prize courts. This ruling was apparently equitable; but, in actual practice, it was so distinctly favourable to the United States that it might have been promulgated from Washington rather than from London. From the beginning, the United States controlled the seas, so that

the belligerents and converted into vessels-of-war, our citizens engaged in that species of manufacture have been equally ready to build and sell vessels to the other belligerent." On October 31, 1827, Clay wrote: "To require the citizens of a neutral power to abstain from their incontestable right to dispose of the property which they must have in an unarmed ship to a belligerent, would, in effect, be to demand that they should cease to have any commerce, or to employ any navigation in their intercourse with the belligerent."

Federal prizes could be taken upon capture into any port of the United States at any time. On the other hand, the ports of the Confederacy were blockaded. Therefore, the only profitable recourse left to Confederate warships lay in taking their prizes into neutral ports for adjudication, a privilege which was denied them by Great Britain and by other neutrals that followed her example. This privilege had so long been extended to belligerents that it had become regarded almost as a right. From first to last, the Confederate authorities claimed that "right," but in vain.\*

Again, it was decided that the war vessels of either belligerent could obtain coal and provisions at British ports. Such was the theory of the British ruling, but this privilege in several instances was denied to Confederate warships. This was notably the case at Gibraltar. The Confederate warship *Sumter* was laid up there and sold, chiefly because Captain Semmes was unable to secure coal until after he was blockaded by a Federal squadron. Had he been able to get out with the *Sumter* on that occasion, the skill of this Confederate naval officer might not have been available for the destructive career of the *Alabama*, of which he later became commander. One of the officers on the *Alabama* was Acting Master Bulloch of Georgia,

\* The facts here brought forward to show that Great Britain was not legally culpable in the matter of the *Alabama* claims must not be understood as impugning the testimony of the American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, who held that the British officials were lax in making inquiry as to the purposes of the vessel under construction.



an uncle of Theodore Roosevelt. At one time or another, Bulloch, like the other Confederate officers under Semmes, complained of the *official* hostility of the British to the cause of the Confederacy; and, in passing judgment upon the actions of a neutral, the *official* attitude is all-important.

With regard to private views or sentiment, it cannot successfully be denied that the larger number of the influential people of Great Britain were in sympathy with the Confederacy. This sympathy was partly sentimental, partly political. A large number of Britons engaged in commerce and manufacturing were not so much in favour of the independence of the Confederacy as they were opposed to the political policies of the United States. The South had long contended for low tariffs, or free trade, while the North had sought and obtained high tariffs. The Confederacy, therefore, promised a market for British manufactures; the North would shut them out. The fact, also, that the South was the largest producer of cotton for the great British mills had considerable effect on British sentiment.\*

\* In 1863, Henry Ward Beecher spoke at Liverpool in an effort to turn popular sentiment toward the Federal Government and the North. In the course of his address, he declared: "There must be liberty to distribute and exchange products of industry in any market *without burdensome tariffs, without imposts, and without vexatious regulations.* . . . *The comprehensive law of ideal industrial conditions of the world is free manufacture and free trade.*" Mr. Beecher doubtless believed in the faith he here expressed, but his audience interrupted him with cries of "The Morrill Tariff!" This tariff had just been passed by the Federal Congress at the behest of the Northern manufacturers and represented the



There was, on the other hand, a strong minority among the so-called "higher classes" in Britain who favoured the North. When, also, it seemed likely that, with the triumph of the North, all of the restored Union would follow the example set by some of the States and the British Empire in the abolition of slavery, even the involuntarily idle and suffering workingmen of the Lancashire mill districts declared themselves in favour of the Federal Government and cause.\*

highest barrier yet raised against British and other importations.

\* There exists to-day a wide-spread popular impression that the principal issue at stake in the War of Secession was that of slavery; in short, that the North fought to abolish it and the South to perpetuate it. The abolition of slavery, however, was an incidental outcome of the struggle, and it is often forgotten how frequently President Lincoln stated that the war aims of the Federal Government were altogether involved in the preservation of the Union, whether "with or without slavery." The Emancipation Proclamation did not, in fact, free any slaves in the loyal States or in those parts of the South then under Federal authority. In 1864, Jefferson Davis prepared to send a commissioner to Europe offering to guarantee the emancipation of the negroes in return for recognition of the Confederacy. This proposition was placed before the Government of Great Britain; but Premier Palmerston replied that under no circumstances would her Majesty's Government offer recognition to the Confederate States. On the other hand, there is little doubt that an autocracy or any government hostile to the United States would have attempted to take advantage of any one of a number of opportunities to cut in two the power and territory of a commercial and political rival. The essential harmony of principles between the governments of the United States and Great Britain prevented such an outcome. In somewhat similar fashion, the essential agreement of the political ideals of the people of the Northern and the Southern States led to a permanent and complete healing of the wounds of war just as soon thereafter as military recon-

Throughout the past century of Anglo-American peace, no one would pretend to say that in favouring the United States, the Government of Great Britain was acting in a purely altruistic and unselfish manner. On the contrary, the liberal statesmen of Great Britain perceived that it was to the best interests of Great Britain to maintain friendly relations with the United States; and this in turn, promoted the welfare of American democracy. Fewer statesmen in America than in Britain saw or at least openly professed this view of mutual profit from mutual concessions. In Britain, whenever ultra-conservative leaders gained control, their natural coldness for the peculiar democracy of the United States was as often tempered by the appearance of war clouds in Europe. For example, political disturbances of this nature materially aided in overcoming conservative opposition to discussion and arbitration of the *Alabama* claims.

Some twenty years later, or during President Cleveland's second administration, the sharp controversy which arose between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, voiced by Secretary Olney on the one side and Lord Salisbury on the other, not only caused no breach between the two great branches of Anglo-Celtic democracy, but the dispute had the ultimate effect of cementing the bonds of friendship and of laying a firmer basis for international peace. The discussion of the points at issue was frank and open, and the people of both nations became interested

struction ended and the principles of self-government were restored.

in working for a better understanding. They, at least, would not permit their duly elected representatives, or the jingo element, or the merely disaffected, to lead them into a conflict if it could honourably be avoided. At no time did the spirit of Anglo-Celtic democracy show to better advantage. The declaration of Secretary Olney, based, perhaps, on Senator Sumner's chauvinistic oratory of 1869, that, in effect, Great Britain had no established rights on the whole American Continent which the United States was bound to respect was, in American opinion, untenable; although the special interest of the United States in Venezuela under the Monroe Doctrine was upheld and maintained. On the other hand, the people of Great Britain set themselves to smoothing over the brusque reply of their Premier, and the propriety of the inquiry of the United States Government into the relations between European Powers and the South American Republics was acknowledged. Both peoples, aroused by the belligerent tone of their elected representatives, felt a sudden sense of shock that such official action might at any time lead to a breach of an Anglo-American peace which had lasted through several generations.\*

\* During the War of Secession and in the midst of a remarkable display of provincialism on the part of Senator Sumner and Secretary Seward, it is nowhere evident that Abraham Lincoln exhibited a wish for anything other than the most friendly relations with the British Government and people. Sumner, as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, made perhaps the most preposterous demands ever seriously proposed to a friendly nation. He estimated the *Alabama* claims and the damages due the United States by Great Britain on the basis of the Federal cost of maintenance

The immediate effect of this dispute led, after further discussion, not only to its settlement by arbitration; but the two governments proceeded to seize the opportunity to adjust a number of other differences, some of them of long standing. Furthermore, a general treaty of arbitration was signed in Washington in January, 1897. This treaty was intended to cover any matters which should come up for controversy between the two great English-speaking peoples. The terms of the agreement met with the approval of leading statesmen in either country, but certain political influences were at work in the United States against its final ratification. These influences, together with the traditional distrust of Great Britain, induced the United States Senate to reject the treaty; although, even in the face of violent opposition, ratification failed by a small margin on the required two-thirds majority.\*

It was during the Spanish-American war that tradi-

of the War of Secession; and he expressed the belief that, under the circumstances, the British flag had best be withdrawn altogether from the North American continent. It is an interesting fact that John Hay, President Lincoln's private secretary and biographer, became Secretary of State under President McKinley. Had Lincoln been a leader of the type which has, from time to time, sought to create popular sentiment against Great Britain, Hay's political inheritance would not have led him to further Jefferson's ideas of a "cordial friendship" between Britain and America, which Hay did as far as lay in his power.

\* In the meantime, United States revenue cutters were seizing British-owned sailing vessels in Bering Sea. This dispute alone might have brought the two nations to blows. It also was settled by arbitration, as in the case of a Canadian fisheries difference at about the same period.



tional distrust of the British Government and people received the severest blow of the nineteenth century. In striking contrast to the strongly-expressed condemnation of the autocracies of Europe, together with the disapproval of republican France, the people of Great Britain, through their Press and government officials, endorsed America's determination to set Cuba free from misrule and despotism. The liberal attitude of Great Britain in 1823 had aroused no such popular response as this unexpected evidence of British sympathy with the latest aspirations of American democracy. The position or viewpoint of the British Government was specifically illustrated by the now-famous incident at Manila Bay, wherein the American commander, disturbed by the dubious and high-handed actions of the commander of a powerful German fleet, received prompt assurances of support from the British naval forces.\*

\* It is more than likely that some of the American officers at Manila remembered at that time the incident at Samoa ten years before when the German consul there had set up his own selection as king of the island. The German naval forces at Samoa began to take an active part against the deposed ruler, who had been friendly to American interests. Accordingly, the *Adler* was despatched to shell a village, the people of which had declared in favour of the former king. The plans of the *Adler* were upset by the appearance of the American cruiser *Adams* under Commander Leary. This American sailor of Irish descent did not intend that the friends of the United States should be fired upon without protest. He therefore put the *Adams* in line of the *Adler's* fire and made ready for active participation in any proceedings that might follow. The commander of the *Adler* was not prepared to shell a United States cruiser, so that he abandoned his plans and returned to Apia. This action of Commander Leary at Samoa might well be compared with that of Captain Ingraham at



The decade following the war with Spain showed a great increase of sympathy between well-informed Americans on the one side and liberal Britons on the other. Statesmen, diplomats, and writers, like Hay, Root, Choate, Grey, Bryce, and Pauncefoot, took advantage of the newly-aroused feeling of kinship in political ideals to settle several points of difference. By the purchase of Alaska in 1867, the already vast extent of boundary line between the United States and Canada had been about doubled. The claims of the two countries differed widely; but there was no hasty call to arms, no rush by either people to possess the territory in dispute, and there were no political outcries as in the "roaring forties." Moreover, the

Smyrna. Cf. p. 77. Commander Leary's course in this whole difficult and dangerous proceeding at Samoa constitutes a brief but highly creditable chapter in American naval records. Part of his note to the commander of the *Adler*, as the latter was arrogantly preparing to attack the natives and risk also the destruction of American lives and property, should inspire a thrill of pride in his fellow-countrymen for all time. In reference to his countrymen's rights and interests, Commander Leary declared, as he placed himself between the German and his prospective victims: "*I am here for the purpose of protecting the same.*"

The democracy of Great Britain was, for a long time, accused of the apparent inconsistency of holding the people of India and other semi-developed countries in a kind of tutelage. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the people of Great Britain regarded the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States with especial satisfaction. The British people did not envy the American Republic any such acquisitions. On the contrary, they wanted a fellow-democracy to share in some of the grave responsibilities which had, in many cases, been thrust upon them. A greater similarity in policy and destiny brought about a mutual sympathy in common problems. President McKinley's expressions as to "benevolent assimilation," aroused far more unfavourable criticism in America than they did in England.

English-speaking democracies had begun to feel that they had formed a habit of settling all differences through bi-national discussion or by arbitration. The decisions of the tribunals of arbitration were accepted in good temper by both sides in a manner not unlike that in which parties to controversies in the United States have come to accept the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

During Roosevelt's administration, Elihu Root, as the American Secretary of State, and Ambassador Bryce on the part of Great Britain, signed (April 8, 1908) an arbitration convention which ultimately succeeded in securing the approval of the United States Senate. It was not so comprehensive an agreement as that proposed by Olney and Pauncefoot, but it served, almost immediately, a beneficent purpose. The dispute as to the Canadian fisheries was referred to the Hague Tribunal, with the result that this century-old difficulty was adjusted to the relief of the people of both nations.

Last to be mentioned here, but by no means the least important of the discussions with Great Britain, is that relating to the construction of the Panama Canal. In the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, the United States and Great Britain had agreed to joint control of any inter-oceanic waterway which might be constructed in Central America. In the course of the vast development of the interests of the United States, the idea of the proposed joint control of an American project had become intolerable to American sentiment. It was thought that no canal was prefer-

able to a canal not exclusively under American control. It was so represented to Great Britain; and British statesmen, in the interests of world trade, agreed to give up British rights, as defined under the original treaty. Consequently, the Hay-Pauncefote agreement of 1901 superseded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850. By the terms of this agreement, Great Britain withdrew from participation in the construction and control of the canal. The United States proceeded to act with complete freedom and the Federal Government agreed to stand sponsor for the neutralisation of the waterway when finished. This bi-national discussion, the British concessions, and the agreement flowing therefrom are not only highly creditable to the open diplomacy of the two Powers, but their joint action has already served and will continue to serve the trade and commerce of all the world.

The English-speaking democracies constitute the expansion of the liberty-loving Anglo-Celtic race. They consist of two great divisions and seven separate peoples: the United States, with its dependencies, on the one side; and Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the British Isles, with their dependencies, on the other. To-day, over-proud Britons on the one hand and over-boastful Americans on the other may not like the idea of learning from each other how one has excelled the other in working out different phases of their Anglo-Celtic political ideals, yet each may profit by the achievements and avoid the mistakes of the other; and both have lessons to learn from the separate democracies of five other

English-speaking peoples whose principles of political liberty may be traced to the same source. Whatever menaces the democracy of one of the seven English-speaking peoples menaces democracy the world over; and whatever tends to strengthen the peaceful democracy of one or more of these peoples tends to promote the welfare of popular government everywhere. Between the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples a beneficent peace has prevailed for over one hundred years. In view of the world-conflict between the forces of autocracy and democracy to-day, we begin to realise for the first time, that had a mere traditional distrust, engendered by historical misconceptions, fanned Anglo-American political differences into a doubly disastrous conflict, government of the people, by the people, and for the people might indeed have perished from the earth.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUGGESTIONS

The foregoing pages have treated an historical subject in a manner rather less "technical" than "popular." Nevertheless, in this work, also, particularly if it offer a more or less unaccustomed viewpoint or interpretation, the reader will desire either to know the sources of the writer's information or to have suggestions made showing where he may read further on the subject. Perhaps he may wish to do both. But the author who conscientiously wishes to help his readers faces a difficult problem in the kind of bibliography he shall present. It is comparatively easy to mention from the library catalog approximately all the books which bear upon the subject. The author is relieved thereby of the responsibility of selection, but the reader is perplexed—and perhaps both discouraged and disgusted.

On the beginnings of America, works of a readily accessible and popular nature are yet to appear, and there are few even of the "technical" volumes which do not have to be revised in the light of new evidence on this period of the parentage and birth of Anglo-American democracy. Captain John Smith's works, as histories of the founding of the Jamestown colony, are thoroughly unreliable. On the other hand, a large number of the records of the colonists and the parent company have been gathered and published by Alex-



ander Brown in two volumes, entitled: *The Genesis of the United States*. The same author brought out also *The First Republic in America* and *English Politics in Early Virginia History*. See also Tyler's *England in America*.\*

After the period of the "parentage and birth" of Anglo-American colonisation, we have Governor Bradford's veracious chronicle of the beginnings of the Massachusetts settlement. From this point on, the authorities multiply and the matter of selection becomes a difficult one. If the three volumes of Professor Osgood's *American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* seem too formidable, there are other presentations in single volumes or in portions of some of the volumes edited or prepared by Johnson, Hart, Avery (popular), Wiley and Rines (popular with frequent documentary reprints for reference), etc., etc.

These general authorities could be multiplied almost *ad infinitum*. For the later periods, the reader will be more interested in the works which he would care to follow in the development of the broader, non-provincial viewpoint of British-American and other international relations touched upon in the foregoing pages. Such are, for example, the valuable contributions of George Louis Beer: *Origins of the British Colonial System*, *British Colonial Policy*, *The Old Colonial System*, *The English-speaking Peoples*. Syd-

\* As a late and admirable addition to the limited number of reliable volumes based on the "popular records of our first colony" should be mentioned Professor Charles Mills Gayley's brief volume on *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America*—which appeared after the foregoing pages had been written.

ney George Fisher: *The True History of the American Revolution, The Struggle for American Independence*. Dunning: *The British Empire and the United States*. Charles Francis Adams: *Transatlantic Historical Solidarity*. Kennedy: *The Pan-Angles*. Curtis: *The Problem of the Commonwealth, The Commonwealth of Nations*. Powers: *America Among the Nations*. Robinson and West: *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*. For brief and readable comparative study, see Bacon's *The American Plan of Government*, and Wallace's *The Government of England*.

Innumerable other volumes of general or particular value might be mentioned. This partial selection has, no doubt, wrought an injustice to other equally admirable works. In the very nature of the attempt, however, such an injustice is inevitable. A few other volumes have been mentioned in preceding footnote references; and it should be added that any modern single volume history of the United States will furnish a more or less lengthy list of authorities and sources. These lists are incomplete, however comprehensive; for it is the latest volumes which have taken the most advantage of the more recent investigations, and the interpretation which may be put upon them.



## APPENDIX

While the foregoing work was in press, several additional communications were received from historians to whom copies of the MS. had been sent. One of these letters was from Dr. Charles M. Andrews, Professor of American History at Yale University. Professor Andrews warns the author against a possible impression which may be created in regard to the relative value of the terms "liberty" and "democracy" as used in the seventeenth century and that implied by such terms to-day.

The author has assumed, however, that the reading public is familiar with the *gradual development of representative democracy* and that they would not interpret the ideals of Sir Edwin Sandys in framing the "Great American Charter of Liberty" of 1609 as extending, for example, the principles of universal suffrage to the settlements in America. It is not intended, of course, that there should be presented an "antithesis of democracy versus despotism" between the ideas of Sandys and the Smith faction in the Virginia Company. Nevertheless, James I referred to Sandys as "*our greatest enemy*." The king arbitrarily imprisoned Sandys and (doubtless) would have deemed it a duty to "divine right" principles to have hanged Sir Edwin, thus making the difference between their views of government one of life and death!

The foregoing may, therefore, be profitably read in connection with the following statements set forth by Mr. A. F. Pollard, called by Professor Andrews in his letter, "one of the sanest of English historical men," and in connection with similar comments made by Professor Andrews himself.

Mr. Pollard writes in the *Yale Review* for July, 1914:

"This incessant change in man's conceptions is the greatest problem of history. If only we knew exactly what men meant by the words they used, our difficulty in comprehending their actions would largely disappear; but it is surely obvious that the worst way of seeking an approach to that understanding is to assume that words meant in the past what they mean to-day."

In the issue of the *Yale Review* for October, 1914, Professor Andrews writes:

"In truth, we have arrived at this idea of what our forefathers thought, by selecting certain documents and incidents, from the Mayflower Compact to the Declaration of Independence, and from Bacon's Rebellion to the various riotous acts of the pre-Revolutionary period; and, construing them more or less according to our wishes and prepossessions, have wrought therefrom an epic of patriotism satisfying to our self-esteem. We love to praise those who struggled, sometimes with high purposes, sometimes under the influence of purely selfish motives, against the authority of the British crown. But this, in an historical sense, is pure pragmatism. It is not history, be-



cause it treats only a part of the subject and treats it wrongly and with a manifest bias. It does not deal with what may be called the normal conditions of the colonial period. It ignores the prevailing sentiment of those who, however often they may have objected to the way in which the royal authority was exercised and to the men who exercised it, lived contented lives, satisfied in the main with the conditions surrounding them, and believing firmly in the system of government under which they had been born and brought up. It misunderstands and consequently exaggerates expressions of radical sentiment, and interprets such terms as "freedom," "liberty," and "independence" as if, in the mouths of those who used them, they had but a single meaning and that meaning the one commonly prevalent at the present time.



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












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